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the  thited  States  Supreme  Court  has  been  strliggling
for  four  decades  idth  the  problem  of  applying  the  "search
and  seizure"  provision  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  as  a  protection
against  invasions  of  privacy ln  the  form  of  electronic
eavesdropping.     the  Court  has  rendered  many  opiliions  in  this
Hmclear  area  that  leave  many  students  of  the  frourth  Amendment
wondering  about  the  true  application  of  the  Amendment  to
electronic  eavesdropping.
It  ls  the  ptirpose  of  the  w±1ter  to  attempt  to  Clarify
the  Oourt's  pronouncements  in  this  unclear  area.    In  doing
this,  the  writer has  traced  the  evolution  of  the litigation
surrounding  the  application  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  to
electronic  e&vesdropplng.    The  Court  first  began  its  application
of  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  electronic  eavesdropping  ln  1928
rdth  the  =0]p=s=t_e=a=d  decision,  when  lt  declined  to  give  Fourth
A3nendmezit  prote®tlon  to  vlctlms  of  electronl€  eavesdroppiflg.
In  1967,  with  the  Ea±g .decision,  The  Court  revolutionized
its  approach  to  the  application  of  the  Fourth  thendment  to
electronic  eavesdropping.    Here  the  Court  departed  from
precedent  to  give  the  ''searoh  and  seizTire"  provision  new
meaning.    in  1968,  Congress,  in  an  attempt  to  legalize
electronic  eavesdropping  for  law  enforcement  purposes ,  enacted
Title  Ill  of  the  Omnibus  Orime  Control  afld  Safe  Streets  lot.
At  this  urriting ,  no  decisions  involving  the  provisions
of  title  Ill  have  been  rendered  by  the  Court;  thus,  at  present
it  would  be  difficult  to  predict  the  C®urt's  reaction  to  Title
Ill.    It  remains  to  be  seen  just  how  the  Court  rill  react
to  these new legislatively  sanetioned  proeedures  in  the
still  quite  imsettled  area  of  eleotr®nic  eavesdropping.
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INTRODUCTION
The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,
houses,  papers,  and  effects,  against  unreasonable  searches
and  seizures,  shall, not  be  violated,  and  no  Warra]its
shall  issue,  but  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by  Oath
or  affirmation,  and  particularly  describing  the
be  searched,  and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  sel
me  Fourth  Amendment  is  probably  one  of  the  most  litigated
provisions  of  the  Bill `of  Bights.    Its  provisions  have  been
applied  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  important  areas  of  criminal
investigation  and  law  enforceme]it  including  arrest,  search
and  seizure,  and  in  some  instances,  interrogation.2    Hie
issues  framed  by  the  Court  concerning  the  Fourth  Amendment
bring  into  vivid  contrast  the  right  of  the  individual  to  be
protected  from  official  enfringement  on  his  constitutional
rights  versus  the  right  of  society  to  be  protected  from
crlmlnal  activity.    Thel`e  are  certain  groups  o'f  attorneys,
jurists,  and  educators  "ho  believe  that  the  Supreme  Court
has  gone  too  far  in  protecting  the  rights  of  the  individual
and  has  forgotten  the  right  of  the  community  to  be  adequately
protected  by  law  enforcement  agencies  from  criminal  actlvlty.3
the  Fourth  Amendment,  unlike  many  other  procedural
1u®S.   Const.   amend.   IV.
2EB:=g  S±Z±±  V.   ±E±±±±  S±±±£±,   371   U.S.   471    (1963).
ife.¥:¥i Constitutionalism  and  Polltlcs :TFOFBmanandew:    ScO Company ,
2
guaffantees  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  is  not  a  self-enforcing
provision.    For  instance,  if  a  defendant  ls  denied  Counsel
and  aL  conviction  results,  once  the  claim  ls  proved,  the
ruling  of  the  trial  Court  will  be  automatically reversed
on  appeal.     However,  this  is  not  the  case  when  evidence
seized  in  an  unconstitutional  manner  is  used  to  obtain  a`
convlctlon.    Unless  this  evld.ence  ls  excluded  from  the
trial,  the  Fourth  Amendment  is  redtieed  to  mere  words  with
no  conclnslve  meaning.     It  was  in  1914  that  the  Supreme  Court
decided  to  giv,e  the  Fourth Amendment's  guarantee  against  an
unreasonable  search  and  seizure  effectiveness,  when  it
ordered  the  eEelusion  from  federal  trials  ®f  evidence  which
had  been  seized  in  an  unconstitutional  marmel..4    It  is  this
"exeluslonary  rule"  which  has  been  perhaps  the  most  con-
troversial  area  of  Supreme  Court  doctrine  conoerming  the
Fourth  Amendment.
Since  1949,  the  problem  of  unconstitutional  searches
and  seizures  by  state  law  enforcement  officers  has  been
a  second  important  area  of  Supreme  Court  decision  making.
The  action  of  state  officials  was  not  within  the  protection
of  the  Bill`,®f  Bights  and  searches  by  state  law  enforcement
officers  were  not  subject  to  the  direct  control  of  the
Fourth  Amendment.     In  1949,   the  Court  did  rule  to   embody
4Ess!Eg v.  IE±±±£g  s±a±£EL,  252  a.s.   383   (i9i4).
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the  Fourth  Amendment  into  the  flexible  f'due  process"  clause
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  but  without  including  its
enforcement  feature,  the  exclusionary rule.5  in  a  series
of  cases  "hieh  followed,  the  Court  sought  to  lay  dowli  guide-
lines  which would  make  clear  the  eonstltrtlonal  safeguards
against  unconstitutional  state  searches  whleh  the  due  pr®eess
clause  provided.     This  series  of  rulings  eulmlnated  ln  1961
with  the  Court  requiring  that  evidence  obtained  in  an  un-
constltutlonal  manner  be  ezoluded  from  state  trials.6
Until  1928  the  Court  was  conoermed  exclusively  rdth
searches  that  involved  a  physical  intrusion  or  a  p]iysioal
trespass.    At  this  time  the  Ootirt  encountered  a  situation
"hlch required  a new interpretation  of  the  "search  and  seiztire''
pr®vislon  of  the  Fourth Amendment--an  interpretation  which
a  ma3ority  of  the  Justices  were  unwilling  to  hand  dowli.     me
ease  under  conslderatlon  coneemed  the  use  of  wiretapping
by  federal  officials  ln  enforcing  pr®hlbiti®n.     me  Court
refused  to  apply  to  the rfuretapping  victims  the  protections
afforded  by  the  Fourth  Amendment.7  Moreover,  the  Court
declined  to  Consider  wiretapping  an  unreasonable  search  and
seizllre  lchthin  the  meamlng  of  the  Fourth  Amendment;   therefore,
5EB±±  v.   _gL9±±=±±±±±± ,   338   U.S.   25   (1949).
e¥EaEE  v.   2!=±2,   367  u.s.   643   ti96i ].
79_in_a_t=9=a=a_  v.   IZ±±±£±  g±a±sz,   277  u.s.   438   (ig28).
4
the  excluslonary  rule  was  not  applied.
This  decision  met  with  much  criticism  from  many  segments
®f  American  society  and  as  a  result  many  attempts  were  made
at  the  passage  of  leglslatlon  in  Congress.    However,  not
until  1934  was  any  such  legislation  enacted.8  Since  that  time
the  Court  ]ras  been  struggling  with  the  problem  of  lnter-
pretatlng  the  releva]it  portion,  section  605,  of  the  Federal
Oomm-rm.ications  dot  whenever  confronted  with®a  wiretapping
Case,
As  electronic  techniques  developed,  cases  concerning  the
use  of  nan-telephonlc  electronic  eavesdropping  began  to  come
before  the  Court.    the  Court  iras  first  confronted  with  this
problem  in  1942.9  If  a  physical  trespass  occurred  ln  a
"bugging"  operation,  the  evidence  would  be  lnadmissable
because  of  the  unconstitutional  means  used  ln  acquiring  it.
However,  in  this  first  case,  no  physical  tl'espass  occurred
and  the  Court  held  that  there  had  been  no  violation  of  the
FOurth  chendment.1 °
The  Court  Continued  to  cling  to  this  ''no  ptrysloal
trespass--n®  violatlon''  doctrlfle  ln  subsequent  cases  until
8For  a  text  of  gectlon  605,  see  Appendl=  A.
9rLo_1_a__man  v.   E±±±£±  g±a±s±,   316  u.s.129   (1942).
1°EEL.,134.
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1967,  when  it  ruled  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  ''.   .   .  pl.otects
people,  not  places  ....mfl
this  introductiofl  ls  intended  to  be  a  brief  outline
®f  what  the  writer  seeks  to  accomplish  in  this  paper:  to
review  the  evolution  of  the  litigation  surrounding  the
''search  and  seizure"  provision  of  the  F®urth  Amendment,
coupled  with  the  Amendment's  enforeer,  the  exclusionary  rule;
next,  there will  be  special  emphasis  placed  on  electronic
surveillance  and  the  recent  KL§±z decision;  finally,  there
will  be  a  treatment  of  the  major  developments  ln  the  field
slnoe  the  H_a_t_z  decision.
"!E±i±i v.  EE±±± ±±a±,  389  u.s.  547  (]967).
CHAPTER  I
Before  eomlng  to  the  maLjor  purpose  of  the  present
chapter,  it  seems  necessary  to  prolride  a  brief  introduction
to   the  Fourth  Amendment.1
me  overshadorfug  importance  ®f  the  Fourth  Amendment
lies  in  the  faot  that  lt  affords  the  people  " [tihe  right
.   .   .  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and
effects,  against  tmreasonable  searches  and  seizures  .... "
At  the  time  the  Fourth  Amendment  was  adopted,1n  1792,   the
Founding  Fathers  Could  still  remember  their  experience  with
the  hated  mglish  "writs  of  assistance,"  Which  allowed  a
blanl=et  authority  of  search  and  seizure.    The  existence  of
the  ''writs  of  assistance"  in  America  during  the  colonial
days  is  rfuthout  a  doubt  one  of  the  leading  reasons  "try  the
Fourth  A]nendment  is  embodied  in  the  Federal  Constitwtlon.2
IIaw  enforcement  officials  are  required  by  the  Fourth
Amendment  to  pr®eure  search  warrants  unless  the  proposed
search is  incident  to  a  lawful  arrest.     The  issuance  of  a
search  warrant  must  be  based  on  probable  cause  and  must  state
On  the  history  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  see  Nelson
:in=a£:°¥ieE#iREt#
E6¥i= EEass ,   1937-i -.--- i ----
I)evelo Dent  of  the  Fourth  Amend-
On (E;iHora=:i -in-e€s
2For  a  general  discussion  of  the  "writs  of  assistance"
a;±g?££t¥io:=dH:k±6haffis:s±±%fa#pngr:=±s:::±iaejE¥g!;Eg==a.
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specifically  the  place  to  be  searched  and  the  article(s)
to  be  seized.3  in  addition,  the  seaLrch  warrant  must  be
supported  by  an  oath  from  the  officer  requesting it.4
At  this  point  the  reader  should  be  reminded  that  the
lntent  of  the  writer  ln  the  present  paper  ls  to  review  the
''search  and  seizure"  provision  of  the  Fourth  chendment  with
specifle  regard  to  its  application  to  nan-telephonlc  electronic
eavesdropping.     However,1n..Larder :,`to  pronote` a  greater  under-
standi]ig  of  the  problems  involved,1t  ls  necessary  to  deal
with  the  Historical  development  in  the  present  chapter.
This  till  be  aceompllshed  by  surveying  the  development  of
the  exclusionary rule  and  its  application  to  ulretapping
(telephonic  eleetronlc  eavesdropping) ,  and  the  applioatlon
of  same  to  nan-telephonlc  electronlo  eavesdropping.
EE±  DeveloDme]1t  g£ EEg  Helusionar=r  E=:±g
there  seems  to  be  some  conflict  as  to  the  beginning  of
the  Federal  Eclusionary Enle.    One  author  attributes  its
begirmings  to  the  Case  of  E2E± v.  lE±±£± S±s±£g,5"6  U.S.  616
:£ri:HDe[:Er=":rHLL±£h£::£#p±£:1?#8Hew  Yo k:   MCGfaw-Hill  Book
(Ifllwaukee :   Hanmersml th-Kortmeyer ,
titutlon
:fru::?trim:r¥m#£.K¥=%=e£::?Si'ge55g=tifis€±=S±'
(and   ed.;
s#e#
#fty§}:gEfgtrfEg fi9Ei±( givanston :  Horthwestem  University  press ,
51,andynski ,  ggg=g± a=± _a_eizu=rTe,  P.   6.
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(1886).    Another  begins  his  account  with  Weeks  v.  United
States,6232  U.S.   383   (1914).     The  Boyd  case  will  be  the
starting  point  in  the  present  treatment.
The  EB][£  ease  was  the  first  of  real  1mportamce  con-
cerning  the  ''search  and  seizure"  provision  of  the  Fotlrth
chendment.     the  litigation  ]n  this  case  was  based  on  a
Federal  statute  of  1874 "hich  provided  for  forfeit.Ire  a]id
penalties  against  any  person  attemplng  to  defraud  the  govern-
merit.7  E.A.  Boyd  and  Sons,  importers,  were  accused  ®f  attenptlng
t®  import  plate  glass  without  paying  duties  on  it.    the
claimants  were  required  under  the  Federal  stattlte  to  produce
ln  court  the  invoice  for  the  plate  glass  in  question.    The
statute  further  authorized  the  court  to  take  the  prosecutor's
allegatlozls  as  confessed  lf  the  lnvolce  was  not  produced.8
the  claimants  contended  that  the  statute  in  question
was  unconstitutional  ln  so  far  as  lt  compelled  them  to
produce  evidence  that  wiould  be  lnstrunental  ln  their  eonvlctlon.
qhey  held  that  this  law was  repugnant  to  the  Fourth  and  Hf th
Amendments  to   The  Constitution  aLnd  evidence  obtained  from  them
should  not  be  used  ?galnst  them.9
the  Court,1n  a  lengthy  oplnlon  by  Justice  Bradley,
voi.::?fifhTfik?arB:%£s±£===±±±'cS=±:::;::|n¥)EEg::E±±±:±'
7116   U.S.   616,   617.
8EEfl. ,  62o.
9ERE. ,  62] .
9
deliberated  the  more  important  question  at  band:  Is  a  com-
pulsory  production  of  a man's  private  papers  to  be  used
ln  evidence  against  lulm  an  unreasonable  search  a]1d  seizure
within  the  meaning  and  scope  of  the  Fourth  amendment?     The
majority  opinion  stated  that
.  .  .  suits  for  penalties  and  forfelfure,  incurred  by
the  commission  of  offenses  against  the  law,  are  of
this  quasi-cI'1mlnal nature,  we  thlnlc  that  they  are
irithin  the  reason  of  crlmlnal  proeeedlngs  for  all  the
purposes  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  of  the  Constitwtlon,
and  tliat  portion  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  wiilch  declares
that no  person  shall  be  compelled  in  any  orlminal  case
to  be  a witness  against  himself ;  and  we  are  further  of
the  opinion  that  a  compulsory  production  of  private
books  and  pa,peps  of  the  owner  of  the  goods  soug]it  to  be
forf.elted  in  such  a  suit  is  compelling  him  to  be  a
witness  against  himself ,  within  the  meamlng  ®f  the
Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Constltuti®n;  add  ls  the  equlv-
alent  of  a.  search  and  seizure,  and  a31  unreasonable  search
selzure`', .`nththin ,.the  meaning  of  the  Fourth  mendment  ....
The  rule  of  law which  seems  inherent  in  this  ease,
but  which was  espoused  by  §±g±±--the  inadmissability  of  un-
constitutionally  seized  evidence--was  not  firmly  established
at  this  time.    The §BEf rule  did  prevail  at  a  later  date,
but  only  after  it  was  repudiated  in  ±§a±Eg V.  E§]£ ]EB±E.'t
It  is  needless  to  go  into  depth with  the  treathent  of  this
case,  because  it  iTas  not  instrumental  in  establishing  the
eJ[clusionary  rule.    It  is  adequate  to  note  that  Justice  I)agr,
who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  was  inclined  to  go
out  of  his  way  to  stress  his  adherence  to  the  common  law
10EEE£. ,   638.
"192  U.S.   585   (1904).
10
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rule  which  states  that  a  trial  court must not  create  a  col-
lateral  issue  by holding up  the  progress  of  the  trial  to
inquire  as  to  how  the  evidence  was  obtained.12
in  1914  the  4§aE±  declslon  was  ln  turn  repudiated  by
WL££;=g. V.  EE±±£g g±g±£E. '3the  WLs£!Eg  decision  established  the
Federal  Ekcluslonary  Rule  which  stands  today  and  has  now  been
extended  to  the  states.'4
Weeks,  the  plalntlff,  had  been  indicted  on  the  charge
of  illegal  use  of  the mails  ln violation  of  the  United  States
Orlminal  Code.     the  accused  was  arrested  wht]iout  a  warra]it
and  his  home  was  ransacked  twice  without  the  authority  of  a
Search warrant.    mrlng  each  search,  one  of  Which Was  conducted
by  the  local  police  a]1d  the  Other  by  a  federal marshall,  papers
and  documents  were  take]i  from  his  home  because  of  their  eviden-
tiary  value.     The  defendant  fil.ed :.a  petltlon  irdth  the  Court
before  the  begiming  of Ills  trial,  praying  for  the  return
of  his  property,  which was  denied  by  the  court.'5
Justice  Day,  who  had  delivered  the  ±±aEg opinion,
delivered  the  unanimous  declslon  of  the  Court.    It  was  held
that  the  evidence,  Wecks'  private  property,  iras  talcen  from
his  home  ln  direct  violation  of  his  constithitional  rights.
12Landynskl,  E±±=2±  a=±  Se±Z±±=:±.  P.   62.
13232   U.S.   383   (19t4).
14EIan  v.  gE±,  367  u.s.  643   (1961 ).
15232  U.S.   383,   586.
in
The  Court  extended  tliis  ruli]ig  only  to  the  tmited  States
Harghall,  and  not  to  the  local  police,  because  ".  .  .  the
Fourth  Amendment  iB  not  directed  to  the  individual  misconduct
of  such  offlclals."'6mus,  1n  this  famous  case,  the  emergence
of  the  Federal  Ekcluslonary  Rule  ls  seen;  the  dootrlne  without
whloh  the  Fourth  Amelidmemt  ls  reduced  to  a  mere  ".   .   .  form
Of  cords.M17
me  "mle  of  the  Weeks  case"  is  Clearly  applicable  only
to  federal  officials.    What  about  state  law  enforcemnt  officers?
Are  they  allowed  to  go  about  "searching  and  seizi]ig"  without
ally  constitutional  checks?    Uhtll  1949,  this  seemed  to  be  the
situation,  but  that year  the  Court  saw fit  to  interpret  tile
"search  and  seizure`'  provision  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  in  terms
of  constltutlonal  checks  on  state  officials.tT8
Tha  Eg±£  case  involved  an  abortionist  who  had  been  in-
dloted  and  convicted  on  the  baLsis  of  evidence  seized  ln  an
unauthorized  search  of  lais  office..    Wolf 's  oonvlctlon  was  upheld
by  the  Colorado   Supreme  Court  and  the  U.S.   Supreme  Court
grazLted  certlorarit`    the  question  before  t]ie  Couri;  here  was
stated  as  follows:  Was  Wolf  denied  ''due  process  of  law"  guaranteed
by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  when  convicted  of  a  crime  on
]6EEEg.,   398
E±7:z±:=±;tyv:D±=±±=ity±£;:i:085¥#§:3ng5-S_-|±=g_2-8=f_:_a_qu±
18wEre±£  v.   =9_9±=0=¥±4_a_,   338   u.s.   25   ti949].
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the  basis  of  etrid:ence  that  Would  have  beeri  iHadmissable
in  a  federal  court.19
the  Court,  in  an  opinion  itritten  by  Justice  Frankfurter,
ooneluded  that  freedom  from  unreasonaLble  searches  and  seizures
is  an  essential  element  in  the  concept  of  ''ordered  liberty"
and  is  entitled  to  Fourt:eenth  drendment  protection  against
state  action.    the  majority  alluded  to  the  idea  that  the
Fourth  Amendment  should  be  embodied  in  the  Fourteenth,  but
failed  to  act  on  the  matter  at  this  time.     Tans,  the  Federal
E[clusionary  Eule  was  not  ex.tended  to  unoonstltutional  state
aot|on.20
rmith  the  majority  opinion  Cane ,a  strong  dissent  from
Justice  ]mrptry.    rm±rptry  regarded  the  Federal  Ekclusionary  Rule
as  the  Only  efficient  means  to  deter  lriolations  of  the  ''sear®h
and  seizure"  provision  of  the  Fourth  Amendm.eat  by  state  officials,
and  therefore  he  urged  that  it  should  be  applied  as  a  part
of  the  F®urteenth  Amendment.21
Three  yeaLrs  later,  the  Court  encountered  difficulty  in
applying the  Eg±£ mile  in  Rochin  v. oallformia.22Rochin  uras
prosecuted  for  the  illegal  possession  of  narcotics.     tl:tree
19EEE. ,  25-6.
2°EEffi. ,  28-9.
21ERE„  44.
22342   U.S.165   (1952).
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deputy  sheriffs ,  possessing  information  that  Rochin  was
selling  dope,   entered  his  house  and  forced  open  his  bedroom
door.    Rochln  was  partly  dressed,  and  his  common  law  wife
was  in  bed.     Seeing  the  deputy  sheriffs,  Rochin  seized  two
®apsules,  which  urere  on  the  nightstand  beside  the  bed  and  put
them  in  his  mouth.     The  deputies  grabbed  Roc]iin  ln  an  effort
to  extricate  the  capsules,  but  'they  failed.    After  their  un-
successful  attempt  t®  get  the  capsules,  the  deputies  then
handcuffed  Rochin,  and  took  him  to  a  hospital.     There  his
stomach  was  pumped  by  a  doctor  imder  the  direction  of  the
deputies.     the  process  revealed  two  capsules  eontalning
morphine.    Rochin's  subsequellt  conviction  was  based  ®n  his
illegal  possession  of  the  two  capsules  containing  morphine.23
Justice  Frankfurter,  speaking  for  a  unanimous  Court,
reversed  the  c®nviotion.    Under  the  }IB±£  doctrine  this  evidence
would  have  been  admissable,  save  the  faot  that  the  deputies
went  beyond  the  acceptable  bounds  of  ''due  process."     F*anJc-
furter,  in  the  majority  opinion,  stated:
This  is  Conduct  that  shocks  the  c®nsoienee.     Illegally
breaking  into  the  privacy  of  the  petitioner,  the  struggle
to  open  his  mouth  and  remove  what  was  there,   the  forcible
extraction  ®f  his  stomach's  contents--this  course  of  pro-
ceeding  by  agents  of  the  goverrment  to  obtain  evidence  is
bound  to  offend  even hardened  sensibilities.     they  are
methods  too  close  to  the  rack
eons titutional  differl enla*1®n
23EEfl. ,166.
24ERE. ,172.
aBf  the  screw  to  permit
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Again  in  1954,  the  Court  was  faced  with  the  application
of  the  W®1f  doctrine. in  the  case  of  E=¥±=± v.. oallform|a25
the  Court  revived  the  ]Eg±£ doctrine  and  made  it  applleable.
Irvine  was  suspected  of  illegal  boolmaking,  but  the  police
were  rfuthout  proof.     in  order  to  obtain  the  needed  evidence,
the  police  installed  a  microphone  in  Irvine's  residence  and
later  returned  twhee  to  move  the  microphone  to  better  positions.
The  police  listened  to  the  conversations  in  Irvine's  house-
hold  for  approximately  one  month  imtil  they  had  recorded
enough  evidenec  to  procure  a rarrant  for  his  arrest.26
the  Court,1&i  an  opinion  by  Justice  Jaekson,  held  that
` under  the  Eg±£  doctrine  this  evidence  was  admissable.    Eg±£
provided no  basis  for  denying  the  state's  right  to  get  a  con-
vlction  ty  these  nea]is.27the  q2±± doetrlne  emerged  from  the
Irvine  encounter  apparently unchanged;  however,  in reality,
its  time  was  grothng  short.    In  1961   the  Court  overruled  the
Eg±£ doctrine  in  favor  of  applying  the  exclusionary  rule  to
/
the  States. 28
in  1957  three  policemen  of  the  Cleveland  police  depart-
ment  appeared  at  the  home  of  mss  collree  dibpp.     they  ]=noeked
at  the  door  and  demanded  entrance  into  the  hotise.    mss  REapp
25347  u.S.   128   (1954).
26EEL.,130-1.
27EEEL. ,132.
28:Ean v.  2±±±,  367  u.s.  643   (i96i).
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promptly  telephoned  her  attorney,  "ho  advised  her  not  to  let
the  policemen  enter  unless  they  produced  a  search  warrant.
RTot  ha,lring  such  a  trarra]it,  the  officers  took  up  watch  outside
the  house  for  three  hours,  at  which  time  they  were  ]bined  by
at  leaLst  four  other  officers.    the  reinforced  group  of  police
officers  thell  forced  their  way  into  the  ho,u/se,  and  upon
arrival  of  mss  }fapp's  attorney,  refused  to  let  him  see  her.
When  mss  Mapp  demanded  that  they  produce  a  search  Warrant
one  of  the  officers  waved  a  piece  of  paper  in  front  of  her
"hich  ostensibly  was  a warrant.    mss  Mapp  seized  the  piece
of  paper,  which  she  thought  was  a waITant,  a]id  eoflcealed  it
on her  person  ln  the mistaken  belief  that  her  bodily  privacy
would  protect  it.    Following  a  struggle,  the  officers  re-
trieved  the  piece  of  paper,  handctlffed  her,  and  locked  her
ln  her  bedroom.    then  the  officers,  in  the  course  of  a  search,
found  obscene  materials  which  were  later  used  as  evidence  to
indict  and  convict  mss  "Tapp.     the  obscene  materials  were  not
what  the  officers  were  originally  looking  for,  but  rthey  served
the  purpose  of  getting  a  c®nviotion.29
In  an  opinion  by  Justice  Olark,  the  Court  overruled  the
E2±£ dootrlne  saying  in  part:
g::i:Eit:i!:¥!:::!si::iigFEi::::::e:::::t::::oTfT::e
p'eople  rest.    Having  once  recognized  that  the  right  to
29EEfl. ,  644.
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prlvaey  embodied  in  the  Fourth  Amendment  is  enforceable
against  the  States,  and  that  the  right  to  be  secure
against  rude  invasions  of  privacy  by  state  officers  ls,
p¥::=€°rt£;tc£:g±±t¥:i:nana:Ln±nfrL:pi;'irfo£=e:goL°riger
Thus,  the  States  were  brought  into  aligrment  rdth  the  Federal
Govermment  eoncerming  the  O®nstitutional  Iiaw  of  ''search  and
s eizure . ''
in  subsequent  cases  the  Court  continued  to  follow
i;he  rationale  of  the  !EaEp  decision,  giving  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment  an  oven more  flm  foundation  in  the  Fourteenth.3t
However,  the  Court  failed  to  apply  the  !EBE deoislon  retro-
actively,  as  ii;  had  done  ln many  instances  "hen  a new  Con-
stitutional  dbotrine  was  put  forth.32
The  development  of  the  exelusionary  rule  ha,s  been  a  long
and  palnsi;a]cing  process.    It  began  with  the  EgEf  decision  in
t886,  in  which  the  first  attitudes  toward  the  inadmlssability
of  unconstitutionally  Seized  evidence  were  lmpllcitly  es-
poused,  and  culminated  in  the  §EEBp  decision  in  1961,  when  the
exclusionary  rule  was  applied  to  the  States.    in  the  begirm-
ing  the  excltlsionaHr  rule  was  not  considered  to  be  a  con-
stitutional  guarantee,  but merely  a  5udloially  Contrived  rule
of  evidence.    moreover,  1t  was  not  until  the  §Epp case  that
3°EEE£. ,  655.
3iEifeEfi±RE.3394u¥5:.133
(:38Z)i
32I,inlfietter  v.  WLga±gff,   381   U.S.   618   (1965).
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the  e=cluslon  of  unoonstitutlonally  seized  evldenoe  was
considered  a  constitutional  doctrine.33
So  far  this  Chapter has  dealt  specifically  with  physical
lntruslozls ,  which  have  been  held  to  constitute  unreasonable
searches  and  seizures.    there  ls,  however,  another  type  of
lntruslon  which  does  not  involve  a  physloal  trespass.    At
this  point  the  writer  will  attempt  to  treat  this  speolal
type  of  ''search  and  seizure.»34
E!±g ADDllcatlon  g£ ±E±  Hcluslonarv  EEE' \E± ,WlbetaeDlng
me  first  case  to  reach  the  Court  that  involved whretapplng
was  _01m§_t_e_a_d  v.  lE±±e± S±±±£±.35mls   ¢a3e  raised  a  question
concerning  the  relationship  of  whretapplng  to  the  oonstltutlonal
guaraptee  against  an  unrearf5onable  search  and  seizure.36Roy
Olmstead  was  the  leader  of  a  "glant''  conspiracy  to  violate
the  National  Prohibltlon  Act,  through  the  illegal  importotlon
aand  sale  of  alcohollo  beverages.    Federal  prohlbltlon  agents
secured  evidence  against  the  tlgapgf'  by  taLpplng  their  telephones
and  recording  th£1r  oonversatlons  over  a  period  of  five  months.
33Varon,  Se?renes ,   Se±z?Ire.a ,  a±±  .mmunitl.es ,  pp.  629-33.
EE=±;;=gE;#:*§8±±?±m¥e£±±Z¥=:'p:¥3:r:t;66iT=S.I?:8i46.
35277  u.S.   438   (1928).
3faor  a  detailed  account  of  the  events  surrounding  the
{±S=±£gfi:a:±d:::eHLt:i::r, ;g5#Ptry.  Wlretapplnff 2= E±±
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The  recorded  Conversations  filled  775  typed  pages.     The  tapping
operation  tock  place  ln  the  basement  of  Olmstead's  offlee
building;  thus,  there  was  no  actual  trespass  on  private  prop-^
erty.37
In  a  five-to-four  declslon,  the  Court  proclaimed  that
wiretapping  did  not  violate  the  ''searoh  and  seizure"  provision
of  the  Fourth  themdment.    Chief  Justice  Taft,  speaking  for  the
majority,  maLintalned  that  f'REhere  was  no  searehlng  ....
me  evidence  was `seetired  by  the  use  of  .   .   .  hearing  and  that
only.     There  was  n®  entry  of  the  houses  or  offices  of  the
defendants."38the  majority  opinion  went  on  to  say  that  the
Fourth  Amendment  did  not  apply  to  the  seizure  of  intangible
property.    M®reover,  a  person  too  uses  a  telephone  ls  in
commtmloatlon  thth  someone  who  is  outside  his  house:
me  language  ®f  the  Amendment  can  not  be  extended  and
w£:|¥df::::::::i:::::=i§:::¥§:¥e:::o:::i:::8.:ie:i;t¥:S:£1n8
This  case  is  a  landmark  c®nstltutional  decision.    Of
particular  interest  to  the  development  of  the  excluslonary
rule  as  applied  to  lntanglble  evidence  are  the  dissents
written  by  Justlees  H®lmes  and  Bramdels.     Justlee  Holmes,
1n  his  dissent,  noted  that  wiretapping  was  a  crime  ln  the  State
of  Washington,  "here  the  acts  occurred,  and  insisted  that  the
37277  u.S.   438,  439.
38EEE. ,  464.
59EEEL. ,  465.
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United  States  Goverment  should  have  no  part  in  such  a  "dirty
business."  Mbreover,  Holmes  stated  that  the
.  .  .  government  should  not  itself  foster  and  pay  for
other  crimes,  When  they  are  the  neams  by  ithlch  evidence
ls `to  be  obtained   ....    We  have  to  choose,  and  for  my
part  I  thi.Ilk  lt  less  an  evil  that  some  crlmlnals  should
::::?fothan  the  goverrment  Should  play  such  an  ignoble
Jtistice  Brandels,  also  dissenting,  made  his  feelings
lmown  when  he  assel.ted_  1n  unequlvoeal  terms  that  whretapplng
was  a  search  whthln  the  meanl]ig  and  scope  of  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment.    He  lnslsted  that  the  Oonstltutlon  was  sufflclently
flezlble  bo  deal  with  problems  not  lmotm  when  it  was  framed:
"flme  works  changes,  brings  into  existence  new  condltlons  and
purposes.    therefore  a  principle  to  be  vital  must  be  capable
of  wider  application  than  the  mlschlef  whloh  gave  lt  birth."41
One  might  eonelude  that  Justice  Brandels  was  of  the  opinion
that  the  Fourth  Amendment  should  be  construed  liberally
keeping  ln mind  its  underlying  purpose  rather  than  its
literal  construction.
The  Olmstead  deelslon  was  quite  tmfavorably  received
thronghout  the ]iatlon.    It  brought  forth numerous  leglslatlve
efforts  aimed  at nullifying  its  effects.    in  1934  congress
enacted  the  Federal  Comrmmlcatlons  Aot ,. which  contained  a
provision--section  605--that  states  in  part:
4°EEL. ,  470.
4]EEE. ,  472-3.
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EN]o  person  not  being  authorized  by  the  sender  shall
intercept  any  Communication  and  divulge  or  publish  the
eristence,  Contents,  substance,  purport,  effect  or
meaning  of  any4guoh  intercepted  cormmloatlon  to  any
Person....
Section  605  was  construed  to  apply  to  the  lnteroeptance  and
the  dimilgenoe  of  rdretap  lnformatlon.    this  application uns
lmpllcltly  arrived  at  by  the  Court,  for  section  605  says
nothing  about  telephone  messages.43
In  t937,  with  the  case  of  Nardone  v.  IE±±±£g g±±±£g,44
the  Court  began  its  interpretation  of  seetlon  605.    Nardone
mos  eonvioted  on  a  charge  of  smuggling  alcohol.    Federal
agents ,  through  the  utfllzatlon  of wiretapping,  obtained  the
evidence  -they  needed  to  convict  Nardope.     in  an  oplnlon  by
Justlee  Roberts,  the  court  held  lnadmlssable,  evldenoe
obtained  in vlolatlon  of  seotlon  605.    The  O®urt  furth.er
lnslsted  that  slnee  seetlon  605  prohlblted  the  lni;el'eeptlon
and  divulgence  of  telephone  information,  ".   .   .  to  recite
the  contealts  of  the  message  in  testimony  before  a  Court
ls  to  divulge  the  message."45Roberts  rejected  the  goverm-
ment's  oontentlon  that  the  statute  was  not  directed  toward
govemnent  offlciaLls  engaged  ln  law  enforcement.     "Oaken  at
42Federal  oormunloations  Act,  see.  605,  48  Stab.   "03,
47  U.S.C.(1934);   See  Appendix  A.
43:E± v.  |m±±± s±atiesL,  308  u.s.  338  (1937).
443o8  u.s.  338   (1937).
45EEE. ,  382.
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face  value,"  he  insisted,  "the  phrase  'no  person'  comprehends
f ederal  agents  .... "460bviously,  this  decision  effectlverty
circtmvebted  the  =O_]pLs_t=e?_a  decision  rfethout  overrulllig  lt.
the  Court  apparently  did  not  whsh  to  overrule  =0|ps_t_e=?4,  but
felt  tliat  wiretapping  mag  prohlblted  by  section  605.
Due  to  the  ambiguous  wording  of  section  605,  federal
agents  continued  to  Ionic  for  loopholes  which  would  allow  them
to  contlmue  their utlllzation  of rdretapplng.i    me  Court
further  rebuff ed  these  attempts  ln  the  case  of  E§±gg V.  =|P±?1±±±
£±±±£g.,47then  it  applied  the  gEaEgggf decision  to  intrastate
as  well  as  interstate  telephone  Conversations.    IEad  the  Court
not  ruled  in  this  marmer  ln  ]Ig±gg,  the  f ederal  agents  would
not  have  been  severely  handicapped.    But now all  the  telephone
Calls  ln  the  Uhlted  States  were  protected  by  the  Nardone
doctrine[48
the  federal  officials,  more  frustrated  than  ever,  en-
deavored  to  find  other  means  that  would  allow  them  to  use
wiretap  evidence  in  court.    in  the  second  gg=±B:±g  case,49
the  goverment  attempted  to  make  a  convici;ion  stand  o]1  evidence
which  waLs  derived  from  thretap  information,  or  evidence  gotten
from  such  "leads."  the  Court  again  shut  the  door  in  the  gov-
46RE. ,  381.
473o8  U.S.   321    (1939).
48LandyHski,  SsaEs±  aE±±  S£±Z±±=±.   P.  208.
493o8  u.S.   338   (1939).
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errment's  face  when  it  held  that  evidence  gotten  from  wire-
tap  "leads"  would  be  lnadmissable  because,1n  the  uerds  of
Justice  Fra]alkfurter,  it  wa,s  f'.   .   .  a  fruit  of  the  poisonous
tree."50
After  this  series  of  decisions,  it  became  quite  evident,
by  their  interpretation  of  section  605,  that  the  Court  was
attempting  to  overrule  the  Olmstead  doctrine.    In  these  oases
the  Court  referred  continually  to  search  and  seizure  precedents
and  it  was  soon  apparent  that  in  the  eyes  ®f  the  Court  section
605  had  no-  independent  'existence  outslde`  the  framework  of
the  Fourth  Amendment.     me  Court  persistently  offered,  in
3ustification,  ingenious  readings  of  the  statute,  but mag
at  the  same  time  extending  F'ourth  Amendment  protection  to
telephone  conversations.     therefore,  sect;ion  605  made  wire-
tapping  illegal  in  the  sane  manner  as  "arrantless  searches;
moreover,  it  made  evidence  obtained  by  thretapping  inad-
mlssable,  whether  lt  be  orlglnal  or  ln  a  derived  f®m.51
In  1942  the  Court  was  faced  with  important  litigation
coneerming  the  Fourth  Amendment  and  its  Counterpart,  section
605.52In   the  _G=g_|=€_S_t_e±±  case  the  Court  had   to  detel'];alne
"hether  a  person  convicted  from  wiretap  evidenee,  though not
a  party  to  the  intercepted  Calls,  has  standing  to  move  to
5°EEE. ,  341 .
51Landymskl,  ±£a=e± aE± S±±z3==±.  P.   209.
52EEEL„   121.
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suppress  the  evidence  in  light  of  section  605.     The  goverment
argued  that  Goldstein's  personal  rights  were  not  violated;
therefore,  the  e®nviction  should  stand.    Jllstlce  Eoberts,  for
the majority,  found  for  the  govemermt  saying  that  only  the
sender  is  protected  by  section  605,  and  only  he  can  make  a
divulgence  larrful  by  giving  his  Consent.53
in  another  case  decided  the  same  day,  Goldman  v.  :P?|[e?.
±±a±£±,54the  Court  retreated  to  the  9±EE±£a± doctrine.    In
this  case  there  was  no  actual  pene±ra.tidn  of  telephone  lines
by  federal  agents;   thiis,  their  action  waLs  not  within  the  scope
of  section  605.    the  federal  officers  placed  a  detaetaphone
against  the wall  of  the  room  adjoining  the  suspect's  office.
Justice  Roberts,  spealcing  for  the  madorlty,insisted  that
there  was  no  violation  of  the  F'ourth  Ame]idment.     me  reasonlngg
given  was  essentially  the  same  as  ln  the  _O|m§_t_e=a.a  Case.55
The  Gal_dman  decision  till  be  discussed  below ln  relation
to  non-telephonic  electronic  eavesdropping.
len  years  later,  in  Schppartz  v.  g§=§±,56the  Court  further
limited  the  effectiveness  of  section  605  by means  of  another
Fourth  Amendment  analogy  ethlch  held  illegal  wiretap  evldenee
53an.,  121.
543i6  u.s.   129   (1942).
55see  above,  Q±_p_s_t=e±d  v.  |±±±£±  S±a±£E.  277  U.S.  438
( 1 928 ) .
56344  a.s.199   (1952).
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admissable  in  the  state  courts.    This  lliterpretation  of  the
Court  coincided  with  the  Constitutional  Law  concerning
eonventlonal  searches  aiid  seizures  at  that  time.     That  ls,
the  Court  applied  the  doctrine  espoused  ln  qg±± v.  oolorado57
to  triretap  evidence  ln  the  stai;e  courts.
This  interpretation  wa,s  a  froon  to  law  enforcement
officers  since  most  law  enforcement  takes  place  at  the  state
and  local  levels,  as  does  wiretapping.    the  Court  had  applied
section  605  to  all  telephone  conversations  in  the  Uhlted
States,58but  in  the  fg±±g[g=±z deoislon,  it  failed  to  extend
the  enforcer--the  exclusionary  rule--to  the  state  courts.
Hve  years  paLssed  before  the  Ootlrt  encountered  another
case  coneeming  wiretapping;  1t  was  !s±aE±± v.  E±±£± S±a±£±.59
Benanti.  believed  to  be  engaged  1]1  narcotics  traffic,  was
the  vletim  of  a rdretap  by local  law  enforcement  officers.
The  officers  were  acting  under  authority  of  a  New  York  State
statute  which  allowed  them  to  obtain warrants  for  wiretaps
ln  the  same  mapeer  as  they  irould  for  oonventlonal  searches.
Acting  on  leads  obtained  from  wiretap  lnfornatlon,  the  officers
institiited  a  search whleh revealed no  narcotles,  but  five
nan-tax  paid  gallons  of  alcohol.    Benanti  was  oonvloted  in
57338  U.S.   25   (1949).
581!|s±£LE. v.   lE:±±±±  £±±z££,   308  U.S.   321    (1939).
59335  U.S.   96   (1957).
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a  federal  cotlrt®for  the  illegal  possession  of  nan-tar  paid
alcohol.60
The  Court,  ill  an  opinion  written  by  Chief  Justice  Warren,
tuned  away  from  the  allgrment  of  section  605  rdth  the  Fourth
Amendment.     me  ma5orlty  relied  on  the  prothsion's  "built-in"
exclusionary  rule.    The  Chief  Jtistlce  pointed  out:
Oollfronted  as  we  are  by  this  clear  statute,  and  resting
our  declslons  on  its  provision,  it  is  neither necessary
nor  appropriate  to  discuss  by  analogy  dlstlnctions
suggested  to  be  applicable  to  the  Hourth  rmerfuent.
Section  605  contains  all  express ,  absolute  pro]1ibltlon
against  the  dimilgence  of  intercepted  commuriicatlons  ....
The  Court  further  limited  the  scope  of  section  605  1n
a  ruling  handed  dom  the  sane  day  as  the  gg=§=±± dee|s|on.62
in  the  E?±?=b:±p=  case,  the  Court  pointed  to  the  fact  that
a  party  to  a  telephone  conversation  could  make  wiretapping
legal  1f  he  gave  his  consent.    Chief  Justice  Warren  stated
that
.  .  .  each  party  to  a  telephone  conversation  takes  the
risk  that  the  other  party may have  an  extension  telephone
and  may  allow  another  to  overhear  the  conversation.    When
such  takes `place  there  has  been  no.triolatlon  of  any  privacy
:Eex¥%hofth§e8#::e§o§¥i£::£::p:ion?°n±§q:o:t¥6u£:a.63
6°EEfl. ,  97.
61EEE.,102.




In  the  latest  case  to  reach  the  Court  concerning  rdre-
tapping ,  B£=g£= v.  E2=[ j±±=.64the  constltutlonality  of  a  New
York  State  statute  was  decided.    In  recent  years  proposals
have  been  made  to  allow  iriretapplng  under  court  order,  so
that  information  obtained  would  be  admlssable  in  court.     me
New  York  statute  allowed  such  a  procedure  in  an  effort  to
utilize  wiretaps,  but  the  Court,  with  Justice  Olark  spea]cing
for  the majority,  ruled  that  the  statute  was  ''too  broad  ln  its
sweep,  resulting  in  a  trespassory  intrusion  into  a  constitut-
ionally  protected  area."65olark  also  pointed  out  in  his
opinion  that  statutes  could  be  written  to  satisfy  the  Fourth
Amendment  guarantees.     They  must  be  ''discrlmlnate"  and
"particularlstic"  ln  their wording  in  order  to  be  constitutional.
In  the  B__ere_er  case,  it  was  noted  that  a  state  was
attempting  to  legallz©  whretapplng  under  Certain  circumstances ,
if  the  tap was  under  authority  of  a  court  order.    In  light
of  the  P_erg_er  decision,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  consider  the
wisdom  and  constlfutlonality  of  ]1tle  Ill  of  the  Omnibus  Crime
Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968.66The  Act  specifically
authorizes  certain  eavesdrops   (whretapplng) ,  but  ls  very
detailed  ln  lts  regulation  of  electronic  survelllanoe
64388   u.s.   41    (1967).
65ERE. ,  43.
66omnibus  Crime  Control  a]id  Safe  Streets  Aot,   fltle  Ill,
87   Stab.197   (1968).
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such  as  whretapplng.     The  general  purpose  if  the  Act  is  stated
ln  section  Sol (a):
Io  safe  guard  the  privacy  of  imocent  per-sons,  the  inter-
oeption  of  ulre  qr  oral  oommunleatlons  where  none  of  the
g=#:: :£o#: ::rm;#o:::i3::yh?£e:a::?E::!z:3 bf;eal:::::
of  competent  jurisdletion  and  should  remain  u]1der  the
control  and  supervision  of  the  authorizing  court.    Inter-
ception  of  wire  and  oral  communications  should  further
be  llnited  to  certain major  types  of  offenses  and  speclflc
2gt;g::#:e3faf:i:£aF-tEea::=r=:::ofh::t:ih:e:ntf:::#1on
:dm££s:a:87the  information  obtained  therebywill not  b
Thus,  the  Act  authorizes  a  llmlted  use  of  wlretapplng
as  long  as  lt  is  done  under  authority  and  supervision  of  a
court  competent  to  ha]idle  such matters.    The  statute  further
llmlts  wiretapping  to  "specific  categories  of  crime"  and
"major  types  of  offenses."  However,  the  list  of  offenses
tuned  out  to  be  quite  lengthy;  it  would  not  be  useful  to
enumerate  the  offenses  at  this  point.68
Moreover,   the  1968  Act  specifically  anends  section  605
of  the  Federal  Oormunications  Act  of  1934  t6  authorize
such  procedur.es  as  are  called  for  by  the  1968  Act.
EE9  AP1]lication  e£  ±!±±  Ekclusionary  E±±E Eg Egg-TeleDhonio
_Fe±i__ip_g_a_1=o   Eaves droDDIIig
thus,  at  present,  wiretapping  ls  presenting  no  special
67EL.,  see.  801(a).
68see  Appendix  8.
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constitutional  problems.    Constitutional  and  statute  law
make  quite  Clear  what  procedures  must  be  followed  in  the  use
®f  a  wiretap.    At  present,  however,  there  is  ariother  type  of
eavesdropping  which  presents  a  ''sinister"  threat  to  the
privacy  of  the  American  public.69This  is  nan-telephonlc
electronic  eaLvesdropping,  to  "hlch  Justice  Brandeis  alluded
in  his  famous  dissent  in  the  olmstead  case.7°This type  Of
eavesdropping  is  done  without  talpering  with  telephone  lines;
therefore,  it  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of  section  605.
The  first  Case  to  reach  the  Court  concerning  electronic
eavesdropping  mos  S8±±a±= v.  !Z±±±£± £±±±£±.71 in  the  above
discussion  of  this  Case,  it  was  noted  that  the  law  enforcement
officers  used  an  electronic  device,  a  detectaphone,  to  record
the  conversations  in  the  adjoining  room.     The  officers  did  this
without  any  interference  to  the  telephone  lines  leading  into
the  suspect's  office.     Since  there  was  no  i]itercepti®n  of  a
telephone  conversation,  section  605  was  not  violated.     me
Court  insisted  that  there  mag  no  ptrysical  trespass,  and  by
the  same  token,  the  Fourth  Amendment  had  not  been  violated.72
un±ve::fFyu£:egg:h,,9ffi,
Ebvesdro
7°277  u.s.  438   (1928).
71316   u.S.   129   (1942).
72EEEL. ,132.
(RTev  Brunswlok :   R`itgers
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The  next  important  case  ln  this  somecthat unsettled  area
wlas  gE LL£± v.  IE±±£g g±§±£g.73rmis  ease  presented  a  new
problen  for  the  Court  to  interpret.    On  Iie©,  a  Chinese
laundrrmam,  was  suspeoted  of  violating  federal  nareotlcs  laws.
The  evidence  used  in  the  eonvie`tlon  of  On  Ijee  iras  obtained
by  a  governem]it  undercover  agent,  who  was  a  former  employee
of  On  IIee.     me  agent,  rfured  for  sound  ithth  a  transmitter
which relayed  any  nblse  to  a nearby  receiver,  walked  into
On  Ijee's  shop  and  engaged  him  in  an  incriminating  conversation
Which  led  to  his  conviction.74
Justlee  Jaokson,  writ;lug  for  the  majority,  sugtalned
the  convietlon  tith  primary  reliance  on  the  gg_|=qp=ap_  decision.
T!he  government  undercover  agent  made  n®  trespass  in  that  he
was  admitted  with  On  Lee's  e®nsent,  thereby  not  infringing
on  the  defendant's  oonstltutiona|  rights.75
The  Oour.t,  ill  1961,  again  cane  face-to-face  rdth  the
problems  surrounding  eleotronlc  eavesdropping.76For  the  first
time,  it  overruled  a  convictl®n  gotten  by means  of  an
electronic  eavesdrop.     The  police  made  use  of  a  device  knoim
as  a  "spilcemilce''-a m±erophone  with  a  foot-long  spike
73343  u.s.   747   (1961).
74EL. ,  748.
75EEE„  751.
76±±±ELrm± v.  |E±±±sf g±gbe,  365  u.S.  505  (1961 ).
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attached  to  it--in  order  to  obtain  information  Concerning
gambling  that  was  believed  to  be  going  on  in  Washington,  D.a.
me  "splkemllce"  wiaLs  inserted  into  a  heating  duct  ln  the  gam-
bler's  headquarters ,  t]iereby  rendering  the  entire  heating
system  a  conductor  of  sound.     Justice  Stewart,  for  the  ma3orlty,
malntalned  t]iat  this  eavesdrop  was  an tLnau.thorlzed  intrusion
into  the  private  prenises  which made  lt  beyond  the  scope
of  the  ®plnlons  previously  espoused  lm  9_o_1_g_p_ap_  and  fa Egg.
The  oplnlon  stressed  the  fact  that  the  Court  eonsldered  a
mere  physical  intrlislon  stifficient  grounds  for  invoking  the
guarantees  of  the  Fourth  thendment.77
Justice  couglas,1n  a  concurring  opinion,  raised  an
interesting  point.    He  oentered  the  thrust  of  his  concurrence
on  the  rig]1t  of  a  person  to  have  privacy  of  aLction  within
his  home.    He maintained  that  ".   .   .  the  depth  of  penetration
of  the  electronic  device  .   .   .  is  not  the  measure  of  the
lnjiiry.    Our  sole  ooncerm  should  be whether  the  privacy  of
the  house  was  invaded.M78
tmtil  Ea±Z v.  E±±±£1 S±a±£s.79in  1967,  the  most  fully
considered  case  on  the  sub5ect  of  electronic  eavesdropping
Was  ±9E£Z  V.  IE±±±£±  S±±±£E:8°1n  1963.     fropez,  un.der  lnves-
77EEEu  5".
78EE±.,  513.
79389  u.S.   347   (1967).
80373  u.s.  427   (1963).
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tlgatlon  for  evasion  of  excise  taJ[es,  attempted  to  bribe  an
internal  revenue  agent.    The  agent,  after reporting  the  bribe
offer  to  his  superior,  was  instructed  to  continue  to  show
interest  ln  t]ie  bribe.    in  the mlstal=en  belief  that  he  was
in  the  prlva¢y  of  his  office,  Iiopez  again  offered  the  bribe
to  the  agent,  who  was  outfitted  with  a  mlnlature  recording
device.     the  recorded  conversation  "as  used  to  corroborate
the  agent's  testimony,  which  convlcted  I,opez.81
Justice  Harlan,  spealcing  for  the  majority,  sustained
the  conviction  of  Iiopez  saying  that  "[tJhe  Govemermt  did
not  use  an  electronic  device  to  listen  in  on  conversations
it  could  not  otherwise  have  heard."   The  recordi]1g  merely
provided  oorroboratlon  for  the  agent's  testimony,  aild  there
ls  no  "  .  .  .  eonstitutlonal  right  to  I.ely  on  possible  flaws
in  the  agent's  memory.w82
An  lnterestlng  dissent  came  out  of  this  case,  that  of
Justloe  Brerman  5olned  by  I)ouglas  and  Goldberg.     in  the
words  of  Justice  Brennan:
If  a  person  commits  his  secret  thoughts  to  paper,  that
is  no  license  for  the  police  to  seize  the  paper;  if  a
person  oomunlcates  his  secret  thoughts  verbally  to
another,  that  is  no  llcease  for  the  police  to  record  his




83EEL. ,  441.
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For  so  long,  the  Ooul't  has  interpreted  the  Fourth
Amendment  in  terms  of  ptryslcal  1ntruslons  into  a  person's
home  or  property.    But,  at  last,  1n  1967  the  Court  tuned
away  from  the  idea  that  only  vlotims  of  physloal  intrusions
were  protected  by  the  ''search  and  seizure"  provision  of  the
Fourth  drendment.    In  the  Ea±z decision,  the  Court  insisted
that  the  Fourth  thendment  should  protect  a  person's  right
to  privacy,  if  he  so  desires  lt,  "hether  he  be  in his  home,
1n  another  person's  home,  or  in  a  "phone"  booth.84
84KE± v.  lzE±±sl s±E!iesL,  389  u.s.  347   (1967).
OHAPIRE   11
the  problen  of  electronic  eavesdropping  or  "bugging"
is  far newer  and  far  graver  than  the  wlretapplng  problen.
It  ls  particularly  serious  because  lt  ls  shrouded  in  a
oonspiraey  of  silence.    Only  ooeasionally  is  there  an  in-
oldent  which  demonstrates  the  grim  truth  t®  the  public--
that no  conversation,  however  confidential,1s  really  immune
from  the  threat  of  a  hidden  microphone  and/or  a  tape  re-
corder.
Unfortunately,  the  law relating  to  electronic  eaves-
dropping  is  even  more  chaotic  and  outdated  than  the  law
relating  to  tiretapplng.    me  Federal  Oormunicatlons  dot  of
1934  is  not  applicable unless  telephone,  telegraph,  or  radio
telegraph  conversations  are  involved  and  the  applicabillty  of
the  ''search  and  seizure"  provision  of  the  Fourth  rmendment
has  not  yet  been  definitely  settled.    Federal  prosecutors
apparently  pr®eeed  on  the  rather  eonoeptual  theory  that  any
fo]rm  of  electronic  surveillance  is  constitutional  so  long
as  lt  is  not  acoomplished  by  means  of  an  ''actwal  ptrysical
trespass."  Po  support  this  position,  federal  prosecutors
have  relied  on  such  constitutional  pronouncements  as  those
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should  not  stand  by helplessly ithen  criminals  are tlslng  the
inventions  ®f  modern  science  to  perpetrate  their  criminal
designs.
However,  this  conslderatlon  should  not  be  applied  to
electronic  eavesdropping.    Its  viotlms  are not  necessarily
uuslng  any  of  the  inventions  of modem  sclenoe  to  Carry  out
their  Criminal  actions.    When  law  enforcement  officers  insist
that  they must  overhear  private  eoaversations  in  private  homes
and  offices,  they  are  not  using  a nerF method  of  law  enforce-
ment  aLgainst  a new method  of  crime  cormisslon,  as  in  wiretapping.
in  his  fanous  =0=1g_sit_e_a_a  dissent,   Justice  Bramdels  re-
cognized  that  the  Ftourth  mendment  ls  primarily  a  protector
of  privacy.    He  polnt6d  out  that  when  the  Constitution  was
adopted  force  and  violence  were  the  only  lmown methods  of
compelling  incriminating  testimony  or  the  production  of
private  papers.    Btit  he  continued:
Subtler  and  more  far-reaching  means  of  invading  privaey
have  become  available  to  the  Goverrment.    Discovery  and
invention  have  made  it  possible  for  the  Govermmemt,  by
means  more  effective  tha]i  stretching  upon  the  rack,  to
obtain  dlsclosTlre  ln  court  of  what  ls  whispered  in  the
Closet,,.,,
wi#em:r=§r::se::i:::L=cfsl:o#Ei:i#totg?o;a:i##fe-
tapping.    Ways  may  someday  be  developed  by  thich  the
Govemm'ent,  without  removing  papers  from  secret  drawers,
can  reproduce  them  in  court,  and  by  wiiich  it  will  be
enabled  to  expose  to  a  jury  the  most  intimate  occurrences
of  the  home  ....     Oap  it  be  that  the  Constltui;lan
affords n
security?g  protection  against  such invasions  of  individual
5_0±[p__S=t=e_qq_  v.   IE±±±£±` S±z±£s.,   277  U.S.   438,   4734   (1928).
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1n  Goldmari  V.  United  States
Irvine
'9E ±££ V.  l±±±g S±a±s±,2and
v.  Oaliformla.3  The  "actual  pdyslcal  trespass"  principle
that  ls  espoused  ln  these  cases  ls  radically  outdated  and  the
time  haLs  come  for  some  Change  ln  this  area.
Most  of  the  proposed  changes,  however,  overlook  bot]i
the  basic  Character  of  eleotl`onic  eavesdropping  and  the
basic  meaning  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.    Wiretapping  and  elec-
tl`onlc  eavesdropping  are  generally  treated  as  a  single
problem,  with  somewhat  the  same  solution.     For  lnstamoe,
the  State  of  New York  has  a  statute  ln  its  criminal  code
whleh  allows  for  the  securing  of  whretapplng  and  electronic
eavesdropping  "ariants  im  the `same  Procedural  manner.     There
have  even  been  proposals  made  ln  Congress  for  a  federal  stattLte
which would  allow  similar  procedure  as  ln  the  RTew  York  statute.
The,.flady with  this  type  of  p±ooedure  ls  that  eavesdropping
invariably  and  inevitably  constitutes  a hunt  for  evidence.
Wlretapplng,  on  the  other  ]iamd,  has  a  dual  aspect.     It  may
constitute  a  search  for  evidrence,  ,but  lt  may  also  be  employed
in  the  instance  that  the  telephone  becomes  an  lnstrumentality
of  the  crime.4  rmdamental  fairness  requires  that  the  police
1316   U.S.   129    (1942).
2343  U.S.   747   (1952).
3347  U.S.   128   (1954).
Rule #°E:=:rke¥%m±::s:r%p#£:¥ir¥4tifeM= g±:=C;: 1 o  ( 1 g67h
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As  Mr.  Richard  Schwartz ,  discussing  eavesdropping  tech-
niques  in  j¥±g  Eavesdroppers ,  so  clearly  demonstrates ,  Justlee
Brandels'  fears  have  become  a  reality.     Today  it  ls  possible
to  expose  to  a  jury  the  most  lntlmate  occurrences  from  Trithln
the  home.    Recent  advances  in  electronic  eavesdropping  devices
would  seem  lnoredible  lf  they  were  not  so  authoritatively
docunented.     in  a  few mlzmtes  tine,  any  telephone  Can  be
transfomed  into  a  microphone  which  transmits  every  sound
in  the  room  even  when  the  receiver  is  on  the  hook.     Tiny
microphones  can  be  secreted  behind  a  pleture  or  ill  some  other
inconspicuous  place  ln  a  room.     If  wires  carmot  be  readily
concealed,  a  strip  of  special  paint  ean  be used  as  a  ulre.
Moreover,  wireless  microphones  have  reached  a  high  degree
of  sensltlvity  a]id  strength.6
Even more  "sinister"  are  the  devices  "hloh  can  plck  up
every  sound  ln  a  room  from  without.    GreaLt  success  has  been
reported  irith  contact  microphones.     These  devices  Can  be
placed  on  the  outside  of  a  ploture  window  or  against  any
surface  "hlch  can  act  as  a  sounding  board®    There  are  also
reliable  reports  concerning  devices  which  pick up  conversations
which  occur  himdreds  of  feet  away.    A  parabolic  mlerophone
can  pick  up  conversations  t]irough  an  open  whdow  several
hundred  feet  away.    The  possibility  of  beamlng  ultrasonic
6Dash,  g±±  Ehvesdroi)Ders®  pp.   303-58.
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or  eleotromagnetio  waves  into  a  room  and  thereby  overhearing
everything  Said  ln  the  room  ls  still  at  the  experimental
level,  but  aeoustl¢al  experts  say  that  lt  appears  very  possible.
The  techniques  seotlon  of  E±g  EavesdroDDers  warms:
]o  be  eertaln  of  defense  against  az|y  eavesdropping
of  this  kind,  one  should  shield  his  room  completely
irith  a  continuous  covering  ®f  alumlnram  foil  and  sub-
::i:u:;::=erh£L£#+#:E=:::Lrg:a:=p=::a?¥.g?pss
The  DaLsh  study  reveals  widespread  use  ®f  ooneealed
microphones  by  state  police  and  private  detectives  alike.
The  study  did  not  include  the  activities  of  the  federal  officers
but  slnoe  eoneealed  microphones  are  used  by  the  Dlstrlct  of
Oolumbla  pollee,1t  is  only  fair  t®  assume  that  they  are
used  by  other  officers  ln  enforelng  federal  law.    Private
eavesdroppers  are  using  ooneealed  microphones  ln  an  endless
variety  of  situations,  from  thves  ohecl=ing  on  the  fidelity
of  their  husbapds  to  business  firms  checking  on  the  loyalty
and  the  efficiency  of  their  employees.    Several  widely
publicized  incidents  have  underscored  the  frightening
potentlallties  of  such  practlees.    One  such  in®1dent  in-
volved  a  concealed  microphone  in  the  prison  room  assigned
to  a  RTev  York  attorney  for  eorferences  with  his  clients.
Public  lndignatl®n  ran  especially  high  when  it  was  dis-
covered  that  the  Sane  room  was  used  for  hearing  the  e®nfesslons
7ERE. ,  p.  358.
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of  Catholic  prisoners.    Popular  indignation  also  soared
when  it  was  discovered  that  the  New  York  Transit  Authority
was  using  hidden  microphones  to  spy  on  the  tramslt  workers'
union  during  a  recent  strl]ce.8
Stich  practices  must  be  distinguished  from  sltwations
where  a  Conversation  ls  recorded  or  transmitted  with  the
consent  of  one  participant.    Law  enforcement  officers,  for
example,  may  wear  a  concealed  microphone  or  reoordlng  device
wh'en  interviewing  suspects  or  withesses.     Infomers  may
agree  to  have  a microphone  coneealed  in  their  clothing  when
they  engage  the  suspect  ln  an  incriminating  conversation,  so
that  p®11ce  offloers  can  overhear  the  oonversatlon  and  testify
as  to  its  contents  in  Court.    This  action  ls  not  as  yet  uncon-
stitutional,  but  there  are  those  who  believe  it  should  be.9
Where  a  conversation  ls  recorded  or  transnltted  without
the  consent  of  amp  participant,  an  entirely  different  situation
is  presented.     This  ls  the  ultlm&te  invasion  of  privacy--one
which  goes  well  beyond  the  normal  conversation  risks  inherent
in  human  relationships.    It  is  absurd  to  hold  that  the  Oon-
stltution  protects  private  papers ,  but not  private  conversations.
Eleetronie  eavesdropping  must  consequently  be  reeognlzed  as  a





search  and  seizure  within  the  context  of  the  Fotlrth  Amendment.
in  any  treatment  of  electr®nlc  eavesdropping,  one  should
consider  the  constitutional  problems  presented  by  that  practice.
First,  there  ls  no  working  defLnltlon  of  the  phrase  that  the
Court  has  adopted  frequently  in  applying  the  ''search  and
selzure''  provision  of  the  Fourth  drendment--the  "right  of
privacy."  Neither  the  Court,  nor  any  one  else,  has  adequately
defined  this  phrase,  consequently  no  one  ]mows  exactly  what
lt  means.     Before  progress  Can  be  made  ln  applying  the
Fourth  Amendment  to  the  area  of  electronic  eavesdropping,
it  Seems  necessaLry  that  this  phrase  should  be  Clearly  defined.'°
More  will  be  said  about  the  "right  of  priva6y"  at  a  later  point.
A Second  constltutlonal ,problem  ln  the  area  of  electronic
surveillance  ls  that  of  the  "all  or nothing"  proposition.
This  simply means  that  law  enforcement  offlclals  should
either  be  allowed  to  use  electronic  surveillance  at  any
time  or  that  electronic  surveillance  should  be  outlawed
altogether.    It  goes  without  saying  that  this  ls  no  solution
t®  the  eavesdropping  problem.     It  seems  obvious  that  the
unfettered  use  of  electronle  surveillance  carmot  be  allowed,
nor  would  one  suggest  the  Complete  outlawlLng  of  this  al-
ready  proven  effective  law  enforcement  tool.
lot).8.  King,   ''ELeetronlo  Surveillance  and  Oonstltrtlonal
Rights:   Son
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A  third  constitutional  problem  ls  that  of  determlnlng
what  the  relationship  is  between  the  ''search  and  seizure"
provision  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  a]id  the  practice  of  elec-
tronic  survelllanoe.    one  might  oonclude  that  this  is  the  Crux
of  the  entire  matter,  because  if  this  problem  Could  be  solved,
all  Others  surrounding  the  Fourth  mendment  and  electronic
eavesdropping  would  be  solved  aut®matlcally.    A  certain
relationship  has  been  developed  by  the  Court  already,  but  this
has  not  served  to  solve  any  problems  as  yet.11
A  fourth  problem  ls  tliat  posed  by  the  advanoenent  of  tech-
nology  ln  the  aregi  of  electronic  eavesdropping  techalques.
Technological  advances  have  allowed  law  enforcement  officers
to  listen  and  record  private  oonversations  without  violating
existing  applications  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.     Of  coul.se,
while  the  Fourth  Amendment  ls  not  violated  in  terms  of  the
present  Supreme  court  rulings,1t  ls  Contended  here  that  the
Fourth  Amendment  rights  of  the  victim  of  the  electronic
surveillance  are  severely  limited.'2As  has  already  been
indicated  at  a  previous  point  in  this  chapter,  the  state  of
the  technology  ln  this  area  ls  a  grave  danger  t®  the  right
of  prlvaey  of  every  citizen.    the  oonstitwtional  pronouncements
in
A  Reappra
Law  Review 378    (1965).
12Ibid .
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So  far  in  this  area  have  not  considered  tills  new  technology.13
The  last  problem  to  be  oonsldered  is  that  of  the  effect-
iveness  of  the  Fourth  Amendmeflt  limitation  on  electronic  eaves-
dropping  by  law  enforcement  officials.     This  limitation  has  been
viewed  Iron  three  general  positions:   (1 )  absolute  prohibition;
(2)  unrestricted  use;   (3)  limited  controlled  use.    It  has  al-
ready  been  determined  that  electronic  surveillance  ls  an  effective
laLw  enforoememt  tool;   consequently,  it  should  be  allowed  to  a
certain  extent.    It  is  suggested  that  the  Fourth  Amendment,
with  its  enforcer,  the  exclusionary  rtile,  be  used  to  control
the  use  of  electronic  surveillance.    It  is  admitted  that  this
application  would  not  control  all  electronic  surveillance,
but  it  would  serve  to  keep  the  police  within  oonstitutlonal
bounds  when  their  surveillance  is  conviction  oriented.    Police
Surveillance  intended  as  harassment  would  not  be' aLffeoted.t4
It  would  seen  that  the  entire  problem  surrounding  the
Fourth  Amendment's  applleatlon  to  electronic  eavesdropping
appears  to  revolve  around  the  qnestlon  of  whether  the  Fourth
'
thendment  guarantees  a  "right  of  privacy"  or  "hether  lt  pri-
marily  protects  individuals  against  gover]rmentaLl  intrusions
upon  their  private  property.    It  seems  urmeeessary  to  state
13see  note  6  gEEE.
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that  electronic  eavesdropping  poses  a  serious  threat  to  the
individual's  right  of  privacy,  and  it  has  challeflged  the
Fourth  Amendment  to  provide  adequate  safeguards  for  this  right.15
What  proteotlon  does  the  Fourth  Amendment  provide?     me
Fourth  Amendment  prohibltlon  against  an  unreasonable  seaLrch
and  seizure  has  been  the  tradltlonal  Oonstltutlonal  protection
aLgainst  an unreasonable  invasion  of  privacy  ln  which  there
was  an  actual  physical  trespass.    It  is  obvious  now  that  this
interpretation  of  the  "search  and  seizure"  provlslon  of  the
Fourth  mendmezit  does  not  provide  adequate  proteetlon  against
an  lnvaslon  of  privacy "hich  does  not  involve  an  actual  phy-
sical  trespass.16
The  emerging  "right  of  privacy"  will  furnish more
adequate  standards  for  determining  the  oonstitutionallty  of
electronle  survelllamce.    In  several  Supreme  Court  rullngs
there  have  been  oplnlons  by  eertaln  Justices  whloh  lndlcated
their  wllllngness  to  guarantee  through  the  Fourth  Amendment
a  "right  of  privacy"  1n  eel.tain  instances.]7Finally,  in  1965,
troni:5¥S::Hog;i:fee:6ife"8:=:±±±:it±al±±±=e±f85¥e?Tg66).
with:fig::=tvg2±±±§±V±±=±:E±±Sg8g±5SS:36§T;§6,1?9(1942)
17Breridels  and  Holmes  dissenting,   Olmstead  v.  United
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a majority  of  the  Justices  recognized  that  the  constitutional
guarantee  of  the  "right  of  privacy"  was  embodied  in  most  of
the  provisions  of  the  Bill iof  Rights  and  especially  the  Fourth
mendment.18
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Courts  should  be `allowed
to  authorize  lntruslons  ln  the  form  of  eleotronlc  surveillance
into  the  private  lives  ®f  individuals  when  there  ls  probable
cause  to  believe  that  criminal  activity  is  taking  place.    But
the  major  question  here  is:   Oar  court  ordered  electronic
eavesdropping  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Fourth  Amendment?
The  very  effectiveness  of  electronic  eavesdropping  lies  in  its
''cloal:  and  dagger''  tactics--its  secrecy.    Can  this  type  of
search  and  seizure  meet  the  procedural  requirements  speclfled
ln  the  body  of  The  Fourth  Amendment?     It  is  maintained  by  sev-
eral  authors  that  even  though  Court  ordered  eleetronio  eaves-
dropping  cannot  hope  to  meet  the  requirements  of  "prior  notice"
and  "specific  description"  the  praetioe  should  be  allowed  when
effective  law  enforcement  would  suffer.     The  problem  that
remains  is  that  of  the  determination  of  whether  the  interests
of  a  free  society  outweigh  the  interests  of  good  law  enforcement.
The  a]iswer  to  this  problem  ls  what  the  courts  must  determine
when  faced  with  requests  for  warrants  aimed  at  electronic
'8Griswold  v.   Cormecticut,   381   U.S.   479   (1965).
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eavesdropping.19
In  addltlon  to  the  "balancing  of  interests"  1n  court
ordered  eleotronio  surveillance,  there  are  eertaln  degrees
of  constitutional  legality  ln  electronic  surveillance  which
must  be  recognized  by  the  Courts.     The  basis  of  the  suggested
approach  is  twofold:  first,  a  distinction  of  Constitutional
dlmenslons  betmeen  electronlo  eavesdropping  which  renders
all  eonversatlons  of  an  accused  ln  his  home  or  place  of
business  subject  to  "seizure"  and  surveillance  which  is
directed  toward  a  specific  oonversatlon  ln  which  the  auditor
carries  aL  hidden  microphone  and;   second,  a  further  dlstlnctlon
which  focuses  upon  the  degree  of  risk  assumed  by  the  accused
in  uttering  self-1noriminating  statements  to  the  auditor.
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  first  method  of  electronic
surveillance  described  ls  ln  vlolatlon  of  the  Fourth  Amendment
and  that  any  court  order  or  warrant  which  authorizes  such
electronic  surveillance  ls  unconstitutional  and  should  be
Prohibited.20
].8sg±=i:ii::°n±L±::±±:±i3;ty(:;66i;°=3in±°H¥VHLe:¥:Ppln8r"Fourfu-itmen  men    Hitatio±1  0n  Eav-es
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Moreover,  a number  of  writers  ln  the  field  are  urging
the need  for legislation  in  this  unolear area rather  than
oontlnulng  with  judicial  determination  on  a  case-by-case
basis.2]Although  there  are  numerous  state  statutes  which  allow
electronic  eavesdropping  for  law  enforcement  purposes ,  most
of  them  would  not  meet  Fourth  Amendment  standards  as  set  by
the  Supreme  Court.22It  appears  that  action  at  the  federal
level  would  be  the  most  appropriate  at  the  present  time.
Congress  shotild  place  ln  suoh  a  statute  proper  safeguards
for  the  right  of  privacy  of  the  individual.    in  order  to  meet
the  requirements  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  such  a  Statute  must
require  that  even  count  ordered  electronic  surveillance  be
''dlscrlminate"  and  "particularistlc."  A  society  which  values
the  lndividual's  right  of  privacy will not  tolerate  the
unrestrleted  use  of  eleetronlc  surveillance.    Uncontrolled
electronic  surveillance  is  pervasive  and  indiscriminate  and  an
affront  to  personal  dignity.    It  is  believed  that  the  adoption
of  such  statutory  controls  and  their  enforcement  by  an  informed
Judiciary  will  adequately  protect  from  indiscriminate  elec-
tronle  surveillance  the  lndividual's  right  of  privacy.23
Right2:#ivieyey2;.±=:±±ea±±±=±e]7H:;P6:¥eeandthe
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Finally,  in  1967,  after years  of  struggling with  the
relationship  of  the  Fourth  thendment  to  electronic  survelllanee,
the  Supreme  Court  in  Eafz v.  ||b±±e4  Siaies,  389  U.S.  347,
applied  the  Fourth  Amendment  as  a  proteotlon  against  electronic
eavesdropping.24
in  KL±£z  t]1e  O®urt  twrmed  away  from  the  outdated  "ptrysioal
trespass"  doctrine  first  applied  to  electronic  eavesdropping
1]i  the  _G=®|_ap_ap  deeislon.     The  majority  malntalned  that  the
Fourth  Amendme]1t  did  not  provide  a  general  right  of  privacy,
but  it  did  protect  an  i]idlvldual's  right  of  privacy when
he  asserted  a  wish  to  have  privacy,  if  society.  regarded  this
assertion  as  reasonable.25
With  the  ¥g{Ez  decision  the  Court  has  effeotlvely  changed
the  application  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  as  a  limitation  on
electronic  eavesdropping.    in  doing  so  it  has  swept  away  old
stamdaffds,  and  clarified  others.26It  is  evident  from  the  devel-
S_ta_t_e_a:    A   Corm
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opment  of  the  law and  the  course  the  Court  is  taking  that  it
has  been  and  still  is  struggling  with  the  concept  of  the
"right  of  privaey"  for  the  individual  ali&  whether  this  right
ls  absolutely  guaranteed  against unreasonable  searches  and
seizures  by  the  Fourth  Amendment.    While  the  Court  ls  s\tlll
struggling  rdth  this  pr®blen,  1n  the  KLgEg  decision  the  Court
has  observed  t]1at  the  strictest  standards  need  to  be  adopted
for  the use  of  electr®nlc  surveillance,  so  that  the  indlvldual
who  is  not  Criminally  oriented  rill  be  protected  against
unHarranted  intrusions  by  law  enforcement  officials.    It  ls
the  lnn®eent  citizen Who  really  suffers  through  the  indls-
crlminate  use  of  electronic  surveillance.27
It  ls  suggested  by  the  literature  in  the  field  that  the
Stiprene  Court  had  two  ob3eetives  in  mind  when  it  handed
dowli  its  decision  in  the  E±±z  case.     mese  were:   (1)  to  limit
the  amount  of  offioial  surveillance  and  (2)  to  bring  elec-
tronle  surveillance under  3udieial  scrutiny.28
me  first  ob3®etive  of  the  Court--t®  limit  the  amount
of  offioial  eleotr®nle  surveillance--has  had  a minimal  affect
27Efary  E.  Bisantz ,  "ELectronic  Eavesdropping  UEder  the







on  law  enforcement  use  of  electronic  surveillance.    Moreover,
since  the  Ea±z  decision,  Congress  has  seen  fit  to  authorize
the  almost  unlimited  use  of  electronic  surveillance  in
gathering  evidence  about  the  commission  of  certain  offenses
which  are  emmerated  in  Title  Ill  of  the  Omnibus  Crime  Control
and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968.    Hbwever,  the  limiting  effect
of  having  to  obtain  a  court  order  has  diminished  the  use  of
electronic  surveillance  by  law  enforcement  agencies.29
the  second  objective  of  the  Ootirt--to  bring  electronic
eavesdropping  under  the  scrutiny  of  the  courts--.ras  aocom-
pllshed.     If  the  govemrmezit  agents  who  thsh  to  use  some  type
of  eleetronio  surveillance would .only  take  time  to  get  ante-
cedent  judicial  atithorization  they  could  be  completely  within
the  boimds  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  prolrided  their  electronic
Surveillance  is  ''discrlminate"  and  "particularistio.r'    the
Oourt's  rai;ionale  in  bringing  electronic  eavesdropping  under
the  watchftn  eyes  of  i;he  courts  was  to  curb  pote]itial  abtises
of  the  progressing  technology  in  the  field  of  electronic
eavesdropping.30
With  the E±±z  decision  the  Court  overruled  forty  years
of  precedent  that  denied  Fourth  Amendment  proi;eotion  to
i7ifeeLir#h±Eife¥±±z±:z¥;8t{?;68i.atheneftyE==s£=,w
3°Jeffrey  R.  Fuller,  "Constitutional  Iiaw:   the  Walidlty
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victims  of  electronic  eavesdropping  "h`ere  such  eavesdropping
did  not  Constitute  an  "actual  ptrysieal  trespass"  into  the
home  or  business.     mis  decision  was,  however,  merely  suggestive
rather  than  definltlve;  it  settled  the  immediate  problem,
while  leaving  unsettled  future  problems ,  such  as  what
exactly  Constitutes  legal  electronic  eavesdropping.    this
problem,  however,  was  later  settled  by  the  Crmibus  Orime
Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1.968.
The  overall  affect  of  the  E§Ez decision was  to  reinterate
that  the  Fourth  rfuendment  permits  only  a narrowly  circum-
scribed  search  and  seizure  of  speoifie  items,  whether  tangible
or  intangible,  1n  order  that  the  action  be  constitutional.31
Supreme  Oour
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We  have  seen  that  for  the  past  four  decaLdes  the  Suprene
Ooul.t  has  been  increasingly  involved  ulth  the  problem  of
electronic  eavesdropping.    this  involvement  was  partly  a  re-
flection  of  the  general  trend  of  increasing  Court  Control
over  police  practices  and  partly  a  result  of  publle  concern
over  the  obvious  threats  of widespread  electronic  surveillance.
in  a  series  of  cases  beglnnlng  in  1928,  the  Court  had  dealt
with  the  issue  of  whether  electronic  eavesdropping  was  a
''searoh  and  seizure"  irithln  the  meaning  of  The  Fourth  Amend-
ment  to  the  United  States  Oonstltutlon.
With  the  case  of  Ea±z v.  EE±±± S±E±£E'the  Court  began
a reevaluatlon of  the  constltutlonal  crlterla ln  the  area of
electronic  eavesdropping.    this  case  instlttites  signlflcant
Changes  ln  the  applloatlon  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  limit
electronic  surveillance  by  law  enforcement  agencies.     the
purpose  of  the  present  Chapter  18  to  review  these  new  crlterla
for  electronic  eavesdropping  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.
Before  getting  to  an  analysis  of  the  Ea±z decision,  it  seems
necessary  to  provide  a  brief  outline  of  the  basic  holdings
ln  the  area  of  electronic  eavesdropping.
The  first  case  to  Come  before  the  Court  was  that  of
1389  U.S.   347   (1967).
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0±PTS±e_?±_  V.  IZ±±±£±  S±±±£±.2  this  nyas  a  wiretapping  decision,
but  nevertheless,  it  opened  the  door  to  the  whole  area  of
electroulc  eavesdropping  ithlch  includes  whretappiiig.    me  Court
held  ln  the  O]mstead Case  that  conversations  were  lntanglbles
and  were  not  irithin  the  protection  of  the  Fourth  Amendment;
the  Fourth  Amendment  applied  only  to  the  seizure  of  tangible
objects.3  Etren  though  this  was  a  ndLretapping  deolsion,  1t  ls
obvious  how  lt  applies  to  non-telephonlc  eleotronlc  eaves-
d=`Opptry.
S9±±Ea± V.  |±±±£1 S±a±£E:4 was  the  first  case  to  reach
the  Court  eoncermlng  "bngglng''  or  nan-telephonlc  electronlo
eavesdropping.     I]i  this  deolslon  the  Court  focused  on  the
absence  of  a  ptryslcal  trespass  and  held  that  ill  such  instances
the  Fourth  Amendme]it  did  not  apply.5
in  1952  the  Court  again  ruled  on  lltigatlon  involving
bugging  ln  9± ±£± v.  EE±±££ S±a±£±.6  The  Court,  as  in  £g±£:]±¥i,
relied  on  the  absence  of  a  physical  trespass  on `the  defenda]it's
property,  in holding  that  there  had  beeli no  violation  of  the
Fourth  amendment.7
2277  U.S.   438   (1928).
3EEE.,  454.
4316   U.S.129   (1942).
5RE.,134.
6343  U.S.   747   (1952).
7EEE. ,  752.
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Not  until  1961   did  the  Court  apply  the  Fourth  Amendment
to  an  eavesdropping  slchation.     In  _§_|1F_exp_ap_ v.  E±±£± g±±±£g;8
the  Court  held  tliat  since  there  had  been  all  actual  pity.slcal
trespass  on  the  property  of  the  defendant,  a  "spike-mike"
driven  through  a  party  wall,  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  did
provide  protection for  the  defendant's  oonstltutlonal  rights.
In  the  words  of  the  Court,  there  had  beeli  an  ".   .   .  actual
intrusion  into  a  constltutlonally  protected  aLrea."9During
the  sane  term,  1n  another  Case,  the  Court  ruled  that  intan-
91bles  such  as  spoken  words  could  be  the  object  of  a  search
and  gelzure  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.'°
Before  E§±z,  tlle  last  deolslon  handed  down  in  this  area
Was  ±2E£Z V.  g±±±£1 g±g±£g."Here,   the  Court  dismissed  the
defendamt's  claims  by  saying  that  there  had  been no  trespass;
thus,  no  vlolatlon  of  the  Fourth  Anendmeni.12
Thus,  from  1928  to  1967,  the  Court  relied  on  the  presence
of  an  ''actual  ptrysical  trespass"  as  the  primary  crlterlon  for
applying  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  electronle  eavesdropping.
At  this  point  let  us  turn  to  an  examination  of  the  EaE±z  decision.
8365   u.S.   505   (1961).
9EE.,  512.
1orng E±E v.  E=±±z± s±±££,  371  v.s.  471   (1963).
11373  U.S.   427   (1963).
12EEEg. ,  439.
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Katz  was  convieted  in  the  District  Court  for  the  South-
em  District  of  Callfomla tinder  an  eight-count  indlotment
charging  lilm  wltli  the  interstate  tra]1smlsslon  of  wagering
information.    At  his  trial,  the  Gover]rmerit  was  allowed,  over
defelldant's  objections,  to  lntl`Oduce  recorded  evidence  of  the
defendamt's  end  of  telephone  conversations,  overhealfd  by  FBI
agents  who  aLttached  an  electronic  llstenlng  and  recording
device  to  the  outside  of  a  public  telephone  booth  from
which  the  defendant  frequently  made  Calls.    in afflrml]ig
Katz'  ooflvlctlon,  the  Avlnth  Olrcuit  Court  of  Appeals  rejected
the  contention  that  the  recorded  evidence  had  been  obtained
ln  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.     the  Ootlrt  of  Appeals
relied  mainly  on  the  constitutional  requirement  of  a  physicaLl
trespass.    Since  there had  been no  physical  trespass  into  the
telephone  booth  by  the  FBI  agents,   the  Circuit  Court  four.a
no  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.]3
the  Supreme  Court,  on  oertlorari,  reviewed  the  case,
Justice  Stewart  writing  for  the  ma3orlty.    Katz'  conviction
was  reversed  by  a  seven-t®-one  vote  of  the  Court,  Jtistioe
Marshall  taking  no  part  in  the  declslon  for  lmstated  reasons.
Katz'  attorney  framed  the  constit`1tional  issues  involved
ln  the  following  marmer:   (a)  the  telephone  booth  was  a  con-
13389  U.S.   347,   348-9   (1967).
54
stitutionally  protected  area  and  moreover,  the  right  of  privacy
of  the  user  was  violated  when  the  age]its  recorded  the  private
conversations;   (b)  even  though  there  was  no  aetual  ptryslcal
penetration  of  the  telephone  booth,  the  seapoh  and  seizure
was  a  Violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.14
Justice  Stewart  quickly  disposed  of  the  defendant's
formulation  of  the  issues  by  sayl]1g  that  the  idea  of  certain
areas  being  constltutlonally  protected  by  the  Fourth  Amendment
is  erroneous  and  not  t]ie  solution  to  Fourth  Amendment  problems.
In  addition,  he  malntalned  that  ''.   .   .   the  Fourth  Amendment
carmot  be  translated  into \a  general  cdnstltutlonal  right  to
prlvaoy."  Stewart  also  stated  at  the  outset  that  the  Fourth
Amendment  protects  individual  privacy  from  certain  types  of
governmental  intruslons ,  but  lt  also  protects  ilidividuals
from  gover]rmental  intruslons  that have  nothing  to  do  thth  the
right  to  privacy.    For  The  most  part,  the  lanes  of  the  ln-
dlvidual  states  are  responsible  for protecting  their  cltizen's
general  right  to  privacy  or  the  right  to  be  let  alone  by  other
People.15
me  Court  rejected  the  two  main  contentions  of  the
Government  quite  handily--these  were:   (a)  that.  the  phone  booth
was  not  a  Constitutionally  protected  area  and  therefore,  was
not  entitled  to  Fourth  Amendment  protection  and   (b)  that  the
14EE#. ,  349v-50.
t5EEE.,  350-51.
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listening  device  did  not  penetrate  the  phone  booth  ln  a]ny
way,  thereby not  constituting  a  ptryslcal  trespass.    the
Govermmeiit's  first  contention was  disposed  of  ln  short  order
when  Justloe  Stewart  observed  that  even  though  the  Court
had  used  this  terminology  ln  previous  eavesdropping  cases,
it  had  no  bearing  on  the  present  case,  because  the  Fourth
Amendment
.   .   .  protects  people,  not  places.    What  a  person  ]mow-
1ngly  exposes  to  the  public,  even  ln  his  own  home  or
office,  is  not  a  subject  of  Fourth  Amendment  protection.
But wliat he  sects  to  preserve  as  private,  even  in  all  area
aooessl
tected.P5e  to  tile  public,  may  be  constitutionally  pro-
The  Govermemt  then  str'essed  the  fact  that  the  phone
booth was  constructed  paLrtly  of  glass ,  through "hioh  anyone
could  easily  see.     The  Court  re3eeted  this  argtrment  on  the
grounds  that  when  Katz  entered  the  phone  booth,  he  was  seeking
to  exclude,  ''.  .  .  not  the  thtrudlng  eye--but  .  .  .  the  un-
1nvlted  ear."  According  to  the  Court,  anyone  "ho  enters  a
phone  booth,  closes  the  door  behind  him  and  pays  the  toll,
1s  entitled  to  be  someethat  eonfldent  that  his  end  of  the
conversation  rill  not  be  broadcast  to  the  irorld.17
the  Goverrment  then  urged  that  the  Fotlrtli  Amendment
should  not  be  Controlling  here  since  there  Was  no  physical
penetration  of  the  phone  booth.    the  Court  admitted  that  at
'6EEE. ,  351.
'7RE.,  352.
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one  time  a  plrysioal  trespass  had  been necessary  t®  bring  the
action  within  the  purfuew  of  the  Fonrth  Amendment.     However,
the  current  interpretation  was  that;  the  Fourth  Amendment
pr®teots  pee?1e--a]id  not  just  areas--against  lmreasonable
searches  and  seizures.    It  was  quite  evident  that  the  reach
of  the  Fourth  Amendment  could  not  be  limited  by  the  presence
or  absence  of  a  ptryslcal  penetration  lnt®  prfivate  property.18
the  Court,  after  four  decades,  proceeded  to  bury  the
01mstead and  _G_Q_|=?p=ap  doctrines   saying:
ifeg:¥£i::i#:i:i:fa¥¥:ty¥g:enu£:EL±¥§ong
longer  be  regarded  as  controlling.     The  Goverrment's
activities  in  electronically listening  to  and  recording
the  petitioner's  words  violated  the  privacy upon  tthich
=dj%#+f5:£:¥±E::::clang:a:£±¥dtg:L£#:prl#Shk°#e
meaning .of  the  Fourtli  thendment.     The  fact  that  the
electronic  device  employed  to  achieve  that  end  did  not
nngpgo:sE!tEt=intralat:L#ef#+c::]grephonebo®thoanhave+
the  Ootirt  branded  this  intrusion  a  search  and  seizure
within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourth  drendment.     the  only  remaining
question  to  be  answered  rmas  Hhether  i;his  search  and  seizure
was  irmreasonable.     me  Goverment  contended  tbat  the  search
and  seizure  was  entirely  defensible  in  terms  of  the wagr  the
intrusion  iras  conducted.    me  ag.ents  did  not  begin  tlieir
supveillamce  of  Katz'  eonversations  lmtil  they  had  sufficient
18EEi£. ,  353.
19EEL.
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cause  to  believe  that  he  was  involved  in  the  interstate  trans-
mission  of  wagering  information,  in  violation  of  federal  law.
Moreover,  the  scope  and  duration  of  the  surveilla]ice  was
llmlted  to  the  purpose  of  establlshlng  the  contents  of  the
defendant's  illegal  conversations.    The  survelllamce was
confined  to  brief  periods  during "hieh  only  th.e  clef endant  was
using  the  telephone  booth.    Great  Care  was  talEen  so  that  no
one  else  was  overheard.2°
the  Court  then  urged  that  this  ma]rmer  of  electronic
surveillamee  Could  be  legally  authorized  when  certain  steps
are  taken  prior  to  the  intended  surveillance.    the  opinion
reads  ln  part:
Accepting  this  aeoount  of  the  Goverment's  actions  as
accurate,1t`<is  clear  that  this  surveilla]ice was  so
narrowly  circumscribed  that  a  duly  authorized  magistrate,
properly notified  of  the  need  of  such  an  investlgatlon,
specifically  informed  of  the  baLsls  on  "hich  it  was  to
proceed,  and  clearly`appraised  of  the  precise  intrusion
lt  would  entail,  Could  constitutionally halve  authorized ,
with  appropriate  safeguards ,  the  very  limited  search an
seizure  that  the  Government  asserts  ln  fact  took  place.
In  fact  during  the  previous  term  of  Court,  it  rmas  held  ln
fgE9gl V.  IE±±E££ §±gE±£g;22  that  such  an  authorization  was
entirely  constltwtional.    The  Court  pronounced  that  u]ider
suffloiently  f'precise  and  discriminate  olrctmstances ,f'  a
f ederal  court  magr  grant  government  agents  the  atlthority  to
2°EEfl. ,  354.
21EEE.
22385  U.S.   323   (1966).
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use  electronic  surveillance  t'for  the  narrow and  particularized
purpose  of  ascertaining  the  truth  of  the  .  .   .  allegati®nst'
of  a  ''detailed  factual  affidavit  alleging  the  commission  of
a  Specific  Criminal  offense.W23
The  Goverrment's  last  contention  pointed  up  the  fact
that  the  agents  had  done  no  more  than  they  could  have  been
authorized  to  do  witli  prior  5udicialr^sanetian,  and  that  their
actions  should  be validated  retroactively.     "ie  Court  observed
that  because  the  restraint  was  self-1m'posed,  rather  than  by
a  neutral  magistrate,  it  coiild  not  be  sustained.    The  opinion
I eads :
In  the  absence  of  such  safeguards  this  Court  has  never
sustained  a  search upon  the  sole  ground  that  officers
reasonably  expected  to  find  evid`enee  of  a  particular
crime  and voluntarily  Confined  their  aetlvities  to  the
least  intrusive  means  consistent  with  that  efrd.
.   .   .   [S]earches  conducted  outside  the  3udiolal  process,w*:hi§ig:§§§§±::¥i¥;al:i:a§!#£::rdri¥§£:::::§±¥=::±#y
Before  eormenting  on  the  signifloance  of  this  decision,  1t
would  be  worthmhile  t®  examine  the  conourring  opinions  of
Justlees  Harlan,  ithlte,  and  Douglas,  and  the  dissenting
opinion  of  Justi®e  Black.
Justice  lfarlan  based  his  ooncurrenoe  on  the  following
reading  of  the  ma3®rity  opinion:   (a)  that  an  enclosed  tele-
23EEffi„  329-30.
24389  u.S.   347.   356-7.
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phone  booth  is  an  area  or  place  that  ls  constitutionally
protected  lf  the  user  erfuiblts  a  reasonable  expectation,,of
privacy;   (b)  that  electronic  surveillance  as  well  as  a
physical  1ntruslon  into  the  above  described  area magr  con-
stitute  a  vlblation  of  the  Fourth  chemdment;   (a)  that  an
intrusion  into  a  constlthtionally  protected  area is  P£= gE
unreasonable  whthotit  a  search warrant.25He  did  not,  however,
interpret  the  op]mlon  to  mean
.  .  .  that no  interception  of  a  conversation  one-half
of  which  occurs  in  a  telephone  booth  can  be  reasonable
in  the  absence  of  a  waFTant.    As  elsewhere  under  the
Fourth thendment,  Warrants  are  the  general  rtlle,  to
which  the  legitimate  needs  of  law  enforcement  may  demand
:=2:Pf:°E:i :E:1.FT8ger]  I   .  .   .  I  agree  with  the  Court  t]iat
Justice  White  also  agreed  with  the  restilt  Reached  by
the  majority,  ±m  that  the  offlolal  surveillaflce  of  the
defendant's  telephone  conversations  must  be  subjected  to
the  test  of  reasonableness  under  the  Fourth  Amendment.    He
also  urged  that  in  this  instance  there  should  have  been
prior  jtldicial  authorization  in  order  i;a  meet  the  requlrenents
of  the  Fourth  Amendment.27
While  the  Court  noted  some  exceptions  to  search  warrant
procedure,  the  question  of  the  use  of  electronic  surveillance
ln  eases  of  a  th]reat  to national  security  was  not  pursued.
25ERE. ,  360.
26EEL. ,  362.
27ERE. ,  363.
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White  assert.ed  that  in national  sectirity  matters  the  warrant
procedure  could  be  bypassed.    He  stated  in  part:
We  should  not  require  the  vyarrant  procedure  and  the
magistrate's  Judgenent  if  the  President  of  the  United
States  or  his  chief  legal  officer,  the  Att®rmegr  General,
::%h:=E::8e:i:ct¥:n=:q¥ui=i:±=:::gt±::g:a:££:?E5yand
]he  concurring  oplnlon  of  Justice  Douglas  iTas  written
as  a  reply  to  that  of  Justice  lthite,  otherwise  Douglas  Has
in  agreement  with  the  majority.     Douglas  viewed  W]aite's
concurrence  as  a  ''.   .   .  wholly 'unwarranted  green  light  for
the  Ekecutive  Bramoh  to  resort  to  eleetronie  eavesdropping
.   .  ."  ththout  benefit  of  prior  judicial  authorization  in
''.   .  .  cases  "hich  the  Executive  Branch  itself  labels  'national
security'  matters."29Donglas  urged  that  the  Ekecutive  Branch
did  not  qualify  as  taking  the  place  of  a magistrate,  for  the
Presid`ent  was  not  a  disinterested,: netltral  party.    Moreover,
under  the  system  of  government  that  we  operate,  the  President
was  not  supposed  to  be  a  de`tached  paffty.    Aecordillgly,  the
EEecutive  Branch  should
.  .  .  vigorously  investigate  a±id  prevent  breaches  of
national  security  and  prosecute  those  who  violate  the
pertinent  federal  laws.    the  President  and  the  Attorney
:®=:r3Tf:a:eg:=p;:L¥n¥:S=:::£dsg:¥±:;,e:g::.53the
Ju'stiee  Black  wrote  the  ®n]jr  dlss.eat  in  this  deolslon.
?68RE.-'  364.
29EE„  359.
3°ERE. ,  360.
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ms  objection  to  the  majority  opinion  was  twofold:   (1 )  he
did  not  believe  that  the  words  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  mea]1t
what  the  majority  held  them  to  mean;   (2)  he  believed  that  lt
was  not  the  proper  role  of  the majority  to  rewrite  the
Fourth  Amendment  ''to  bring  lt  into  harmony  with  the  times"
to  reach  what  seemed  to  be  a  desired  result.    The  first
ob3ectlon  was  based  on  the  wording  of  the  rfuendment  itself?
Black  maLintalned  that  the  Fourth  amendment  protected  against
the  seizure  of  tangible  objects  which have  ".   .   .  size,  form,
and  welgbt  .   .   ."  and  spoken  words  have  none  of  these  qualities;
thus,  he  concluded  ''.   .   .  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  simply
does  not  apply  to  eavesdropping  .... "3'the  second  objection
was  based  on  his  confidence  ln  the  Framers  of  the  Constitution.
He  believed  that  if  the  Framers  had  intended  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment  to  apply  to  eavesdl.opping  they  1.rould  have  written  such
provlslons  into  it.    He  stated  in  part:
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Framers  were  aware  of  this
practice  [eavesdropplng]  ,  and  lf  they  had  desired  to
outlaw  or  restrict  the  use  of  evidence  obtained  by  eaves-
dropping,  I  believe  that  they
prlate  language  to  do  so  in  th¥O¥:fi¥£vfu:::£e:E:38Ppro.
Black went  on  to  point  up  the  fact  that  tmtil  the  case  of
B£=g£= v.  ¥£![ EgEE33the  Court  had  no  disposition  to  Construe
3tEEfl. ,  364-66.
32Em„  366.
33388  u.S.   41    (1967).
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the  Fourth  Amendmellt  ln  such  a  mare.er.     He  reviewed  t  e
majority  options  in  the  Olmstead  and  Goldmazl  cases  to  point
up  the  court`s  rchuctamce  to  apply  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  the
seizure  of  intangible  "conversations."  This  dissent  came  as
no  surprise  to  one  who  is  familiar with  Jtlstice  Black's
Constitutional  pronouncements.    He  interprets  the  Bill  of
Rights  to  mean  exactly  wiiat  it  says  and  nothing  more.    He
seems  to  place  more  reliance  on  "the  rdsdom  of  the  Ffamers"
than  do  most  of  the  members  of  the  court.
iTOIT that  the  important  aLspects  of  this  decision  have
\
been  reviewed,  it  irill  be necessary  to  give  certain  parts
a more  detailed  treatrent.
The  first  area  of  comeni;  is  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the
iurlter  to  provide  justification  for  the  court's  abandoning
of  the  f'trespassf'  dootrlne.r    This  was  done  for  the  followh]1g
reasons:     (1 )  the  ''trespass"  doctrine  did  not  provide  a
satisfactory  basis  for  the  appllcatlon  of  the  Fourt]i  Amendment
to  electronic  surveillance  caries  and  mag  based  on  all  absiird
distinction;   (2)  the  rule  led  to  confusion--it  was  based  on
the  physical  penetration  of  a  "constit`itionally  protected
area.t'  me  problen  was  that  no  one  (not  even  the  Suprene  Count)
could  or  would  define  a  "constitutionally  protected  .area;"
(3)  the  f'trespass"  rule  rmas  inconsistent  whth modem  concepts
of  F®urth  thendment  protectlon®J    Let  us  now  take.a  closer  look
at  this  reaso]ilng.
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the  "trespass"  doctrine  was  a  product  of  the  Oonrt's
grasping  for  Criteria  with thlch  to  apply  the  Fourth  thend-
ment  ln  the  area  of  electronle  eavesdropping.,    Slnoe  the
Fourth  Amendment  required  an  actual  ptrysical  trespass,  it
was  necessary  to  adopt  this  stazldard  of  application  ln
electronic  eavesdropping  cases-.34thtis,   the  Cotirt  Came  up
with  the  idea  that  if  a  defendantf s  properi;y  was  sub3ected
to  even  the  slightest  "trespassf'  that  he  could  be  proteeted
against  such  an  intrusion  by  the  Fourth  Amendmelit®35This  dls-
tinctlon  hgLs  since  become  an  absurdity  due  t®  teohaol®gieal
advances  in  the  area  of  electr®nie  survelllanee.
Secondly,  the  pronouneement  by  the  Court  that  the  Fotirth
chendme]it  provided  protection  only  against  an  "actual  intrnsion
into  a  constitutionally  protected  area"  created  a vast
an®unt  of  oonrfusion.36What  is  a  constiri2tionally  protected
area?    Is  lt  a  h'ouse,  car,  office,  or  is  it  any.where  a
person  desires  privacy?    in  the  E§Ez  decision,  the  Court
discarded  the  idea  of  a  eonstifutionally  proi;ected  area
and  replaced  it  rdth  a  test  ®f  reasonableness  which will  be
diseuEsed  below.
me last  reason--that  the  trespass  rule  is  inconsistent
34oimstead  V. United  States 277   U.S.   438   (1928).
35±±±:§E£¥ v.  E:i;±±if1  s±zE±esL,   365  u.s.   5o5   (1961 ).
36ERE.
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with  mode]m  concepts  of  Fourth  Amendment  protection--was
a  salient  factor  ln  this  deolsion.    Hlstorloally,  the  Fourth
Amendment's  protection  against  an  unreasonable  search  and
seizure  has  been  prlmarlly  oriented  towaI'd  the  protection
of  private  property.    However,  in  1967,  before  the  Egfz
deelslon,  the  Court  had  demonstrated  its  wllllngness  to
apply  the  Fourth  thendment  to  the  protection  of  prlvaey  ln
addition  to  property.37ni  the  words  of  the  Court:
The  premise  that  property  interests  control  the  right
of  the  Goverrment  to  search  and  seize  has  been  dlscredlted.
Searches  and  seizures  may  be  'unreasonable'  within  the
Fourth  mendment  even  though  the  Govermnent  asserts  aL
superior  property  interest  at  common  law.    We  have  recog-
nlzed  that  the  principal  ob]eot  of  the  Fourth  Amendment
ls  the  proteetlon  of  prlvaey rather  than property,  and
g:frv=ir=:r£:S::8Lgnd:::p=£%£5:£::S:31.¥d.p?98edural
It  rill  be  remembered,  however,  that  ln  the  Ea±z  deciglon
the  majority  denied  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  provided  for
a  general  right  to  privacy.39
Since  lt  is  clear  that  the  trespass  doctrine  has  been
abandoned,  it  ls  now  our  task  to  determine  how  the  Court  has
replaced  lt.    On  first  reading  the  Ea±z  decision  it  would  seem
that  the  Court  has  not  spelled  out  any new  crlterlon  for  the
application  of  the  Fourth  mendment  to  eavesdropping  cases.
However,  if  one  reads  closely  lt  is  not  difficult  to  determine
37±±=g£:i v.   E:±E±£:i,   387  U.S.   294   (1967).
38EEL. ,  304-5.
39389  u.S.   347,  350.
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"hat  the new  test  is--it  is  the  test  reasonableness  or rea-
sonable  expectation  of  privacy.    According  to  the  Court,  an
lndlvidual  who  has  exhibited  a  reasonable  expectatlofl  of  privacy
has  the  right  to  be  protected  by  the  Fourth  thendment,  if  that
expectation  is  one  that  soelety  is  prepared  to  recognize  as
reasonable.     therefore,  no  matter where  an  individual  may
be,  if  he  exhibits  a  subjective  ezpeotation  of  privacy,  he  will
Pe  able  to  claim  the  protection  of  the  Fourth  mendment
against unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.4°But  if  the  in-
dividual  does  not  exhibit  this  expectation  or  if  society
regards  this  expectation  of  privacy  as  unreasonable,  the
individual  arf5sumes  the  risk  that his  incriminating  state-
ments  might  be  overheard.    in  the  latter`1nstance,  protection
under  the  F`ourth  Amendment  eamot  be  olalmed.
the  test  of  reasoflableness  ls  not  an  entirely new
phenomenon  con€ured  up  by  i;he  Court  for  the  bealefit  of  the
¥±±z  deeislon.     As   early  as  the  _01p_st_e_a_a  case,   Ohlef  Justice
Taft  stated:
The  reasonable view ls  that  one  who  installs  ln  his  house
a  telephone  instrument  Thth  cormecting  tires  intends  to
project  his  voice  to  those  outside,  and  that  the  rdres
¥¥°::thriL±tEL#fu=SroT€::#:£¥FL=ep%#nrfi:=dm¥en=.41
Thus,  in  the  Olmstead  declslon  one  finds  similar  rationale
as  that  used  by  the  Warren  Court  ln  Ea=Ez.    What  it  all  comes
4°ERE  . ,  361.
41277  u.S.  438,  445.
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doim  to  is  that  anyone  who  speaks  out  in  ptiblic  should  expect
to  be  heard  and  should  not  expect  to  be  able  to  claim  protection
under  the  Fourth  chendment.
in  conclusion,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the maiter  that  the
goal  and  primary  tlirust  of  the  KLa±z decision  was  to  bring
official  electronic  surveillance under  the  control  of  the
courts.    This  was  accomplished  by  the  requirene]it  that  future
electronic  surveillance must  have  prior  jtldicial  authorlzatlon
and  continuous  scrutiny  by  the  court;  that  issued  the  eaves-
drop  order.     The  Supreme  Ootirt  has  now  effectively  placed
official  electronic  surveillance  under  3udielal  scrutiny
in  order  to  prevent  potential  abuses  of  these  techaiques.
The  znajority  took  gr,eat  pains  to  enphasize  the  necessity
of  obtaining  prior  Judicial  approval  and  also,  the  fact
evldemce  obtained  through  the  use  of  illegal  electronic
surveillance  would  be  lnadmissable  in most  instances.
OIIAPTER   IV
Since  the  Ea±Z  decision  ln  1967,  there  have  been  two
major  developments  in  the  area  of  eleotronlc  eavesdropping:
one  was  the  passage  of  the  Omnibus   Crime  Control  and  Saf e
Streets  Act  of  1968'and  the  other  was  a  receait  Supreme  Court
declslon  ln  the  case  of  =A|_a_er_a_an  v.  P±±±g±  g±±±±g.2  Iiet  us
first  look  at  the  provlslons  of  the  Omnibus  Crime  Control
and  Safe  Streets  Aot  as  applied  to  official  electronic
survelllamce.
title  Ill  of  the  Act  ls  the  portion  that  deals  with
the  regulation  of  private  and  official  electronic  survei-
llance.    title  Ill  prohibits  all  electl'onlc  eavesdropping
by  private  parties  under  penalty  of  S]O,OOO  fine  and/or
five  years  in  prison.3  It  also  prohibits  the  manufacture,
distribution,  possession,  sale,  or  advertising  of  electronic
eavesdropping  devices  ln  interstate  cormeroe.4
in  perhaps  its  most  important  provision,  fltle  Ill
provides  for  the  graptlng  of  prior  judlolal  authorization
for  electronlo  eavesdropping  for  law  enforcement  purposes
by  any  duly  constituted  court  of  law.    Itowever,  before  a
'fltle  Ill,  87  Stab.197   (1968).
289   Sup.   ot.   961    (1969).
5fltle  Ill,  87  Stab.197,   see.  2511   (a).
4ERE.,  see.  2512.
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Judge  grants  the  eavesdropping  order,  he  must  aseertain
from  the  investigating  officer  the  following  information:
who  ls  the  investigating  officer;  what  offense  ls  involved
a|id  who  ls  suspected  of  committing  lt  or  of'f being  about  to
eommlt  lt;  what  facilities  are  to  be  lnteroepted;  what  type
of  conversations  are  being  sought;  what  alternative  methods
could  be  tised;  and  the  length  of  tine  that  ls  required  for
the  lntercept|on.5
In  addition  t®  the  above,  the  3udge  may  require  other
lnformatlon  from  the  lnvestlgating  offloer.    It  would  seem
that  Congress  had  misgivings  about  this  new  power  of  the
police,  because  it  aLdded  certain  "safeguards"  to  the  procedure.
A  judge  may  demand  progress  reports  of  the  investigating
officer.    When  the  electronic  surveillance  is  stopped  or
Completed,  the  subject  of  the  survelllapce  must  be  notified,
unless  the  Judge  waves  the  requirement  "on  good  cause."
The  tapes  or  tra]1scripts  which  contain  the  information
gathered  during  the  electronic  surveillance must  be  tuned
over  to  the  judge  by  the  lnvestigatlng  offleer;  the  judge
must  retain  these  tapes  for  a minimum  of  ten  years.    In
addition  to  retaining  the  tapes,  the  judge  must  submit  a
formal  report  of  the  surveillance  to  the  Administrative Offloe
5EE.,  see.  2518.
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of  the  United  StaLtes  Courts.    Each  January  the  Attorney
General must  submit  a  similar  report  to  the  Administrative
Office  concerning  the  results  of  interceptions;   each  April
the  Administrative  Office  forwards  the  compiled  reports
to  Congress.    After  six  years,  a  commission  will  report
to  the  President  and  to  Congress  on  the  effectiveness  of
title  Ill.6
]1tle  Ill  also  specifies  the  range  of  federal  and
state  crimes  for  which  electronic  surveillance  is  permissable.7
Federal  law  enforcement  officers  are  authorized  to  eaves-
drop  for  such  offenses  as  bribery  of  public  officials,
off ering kickbacks  to  influence  the  operation  of  employee
benefit  plans ,  bamlcruptey  fraud ,  extortionate  credit  trans-
aotlons ,  and  "any  offense  involving  the  manufacture,1mpob±atlon,
receiving,  concealment,  buying,  selling,  or  otherwise  dealing
1n  narcotic  drugs,  mar.i3ua]1a,  or  other  dangerous  drugs   ....
Authorlzatlon  for  state  officers  is  even  broader.
In  addition  to  those  mentioned  are  desertion  of  wife  or  child,
graveyard  desecration,  endangering  the  life  of  a railroad
6EEE.,  see.  2519.
7For  the  complete  list  of  crimes,  see  Appendix  a.
8ERE.,  see.  2516   (e).
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passenger,  illicit  cohabitation,  carmying  a  concealed  weapon,
cruelty  to  animals,  and  gambling.9
Another  portion  of  fltle  Ill,  section  2518,  allows
"any  investigator  or  law  enforcement  officer"  1n  emergency
cases  of  ''national  seeuritgr"  or  "organized  crime"  to  eavesdrop
for  forty-eight hours  without  prior  judicial  authorization.
It  would  seem  that  Congress  agrees  to  a  certain  extent  with
that  portion  of  Justice  lthite's  concilrring  opinion  in  the
EE£Z declslon.    Thite  would  allow  unauthorized  electronic
surveillance  in  cases  of national  security.in  an unlimited
marmer  so  long  as  the  President  or  the  Attorney  General  has
deemed  suoh  surveillance  necessary.     Section  2518  also  pemlts
the  use  of  electronic  simvelllance  by non-law  enforcement
bodies  such  as  Senate  and  House  Oonmlttees  under  the  same
restrlctlons  as  law  enforcement  agencies.
It  should  be  observed  that  nowhere  in  the  list  of  crimes
are  those  such  as  rape,  theft,  or mugging--those  crimes
of  the  street  about  which  the  public  is  more  concerned  and
"hleh  moved  Congress  to  vote  for  ''1aw  and  order."  However,
these  crimes  are  hardly  of  such  a nature  to  allow  effective
electronic  surveillance,  for  it  is  quite  obvious  that  a
9EEE.
7'
rapist  or  a  purse-snatcher would  hardly  discuss  his  intended
crime  irdth  anyone  before  he  Commits  it.
Nevertheless,  for  t]iose  crimes  listed,  electronic  sur-
veillance  would  be  quite  an  effective  tool  which  should  re-
sult  ln more  effective  law  enforcement  and  a higher  con-
viction  rate.     So  would  judicious  use  of  the  thumbscrew
and  the  rack,  bnt  the  evil  of  such  techniques  outweigh  their
value  to  law  enforcement.    It  is  suggested  that  electronic
eavesdropping  be  given  like  consideration.
So  far  all  that  has  been  discussed  is  what  the".p®1iee
can  do  with  the  technique  of  electronic  stirvelllanee;  what
protection  does  Title  Ill  provide  for  the  victim  of  an  un-
lawful  eavesdrop?    me  t'aggrleved  person"  Clause  pemits
an  individual  to  sue, -if  as  an  eavesdrop  victim,  he  feels
that  he  has  been  6verheard  lmjustly.    But  this  right  applies
only  to  persons  who  are  actually  overheard,  or  one  against
whom  the  eavesdrop  ls  directed.     The  subject  ®f  an  incrim-
inating  eonversatiom,  if  a  third  party,  ]ias  no  relief.10
Her  can  a  person  Challenge  an  interception  lf  it  ls  made
with  the  consent  of  One  of  the  parties  to  the  €onversatlon.
Also  permissable  is  sun.repltitlous  monitoring  by  one  party
t®  the  conversation  ''not  acting  under  color  of  law"--a  provision
]°EEE„   see.  2518   (10).
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which  may  cripple,  1f  1g  does  not  destroy,  the  ban  on  elec-
tronic  surveilla]ice  by  the  private  citizen.
A particularly  disturbing  provision  of  Title..-III `,is ` the
long  surveillance  period  which  it  authorizes--up  to  thirty
days ,  renewable  indefinitely  every  thirty  days." This  is
unusual  because  even  oonventlonal  searched  lasting  only
a  few  hours  have  been  condermed  by  the  courts.    A  law  en-
forcement  officer  with  a  conventional  search warrant  carmot
enter  a  private  home  and  embark  upon  a  search  lasting  several
days.     me  wisdom  of  this  particular  provision  should  be  con-
sidered  ill  light  of  the  EEEz  decision;  it  would  seem  that  lf
this  provision  were  litigated  in  the  Supreme  Court,  1t
would  probably  be  declared  an  unreasonable  search  and  seizure
and  thus ,  unconstitutlonal.
Etoreover,  in  the  face  of  the  Ea±z decision,  the  eon-
stitutionality  of  Title  Ill  in  its  entirety  should  be  con-
sidered.    Because  of  the  apparent  ease  in which  prior  judicial
authorizaLtion  for  electrorfuc  surveillance  can  be  obtaLined ,
Title  Ill  seems  to  not  only  violate  the  Fourth  drendment's
protection  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  and  the
Fourteenth  Amendment's  due  process  Clause  but  also  the  First
Amendment's  guarantee  of  freedom  of  speech.    Without  privacy
of  commimication,  people  are  reluctant  to  exercise  their  right
„ERE.
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of  free  speech.
The  other  development  ln  the  field  of  electronic  eaves-
dropping  to  be  considered  here  occurred  last  March,  itheli  the
Court,  in  the  Case  of  _41_d=e=¥Lan_.v.  IE±±£g  g±§±£g,]2handed  domai
a  declslon  ¢thich  stimned  law  enforcement  offiolals.
Alde]rmati  was  prosecuted  for  conspiracy  to  transmit
ln  1]iterstate  commerce  communications  consisti]ig  ®f  threats
to  lndure  and  murder.    the  tthlted  States  Dlstrlct  Court  for
the  DLstrlct  of  Ool®rado  rendered  judgement  against  Aldeman
and  he  appealed.    the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Tenth  mstrict
affirmed  and  the  Supreme  Court  denied  certiorari,  389  U.S.  834.
On  petltlon  for  rehearing,  390  U.S.  136,  certiorari  was
granted  and  the  case  was  remanded  to  the  district  court.
the  other  peti.tioners  were  convicted  ln  the  United  States
mstrict  court  for  the  District+ of  "ev  Jersey  of  conspiri]ig
to  tra]ismit  to  a foreign  power  information  concerming  national
security.    me  third  Oirouit  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  the
convictions  and  the  Supreme  Court  granted  certlorari.]3
in  the  cases  before  the  Count  each  petitioner  dema]ided
I.etrial  if  airy  of  t]ie  evidence  used  to  convict  th.en  was  the
product  of  an  imlairfull  electronic  eavesdrop,  regardless  of
1289   sup.   ct.  96]    (1969).
'3EEL.
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"hose  Fourth  Amendment  rights  were  violaLted  by  the  surveillance.
It  was  urged  by  the  petitioners  that  if  the  evidence  was
inadmissable  against  arty  one  conspirator,  because  it  was
tainted  by  illegal  electronic  surveillance  as  to  him,  it  is
also  inadmissable  against his  co-Conspirator  or  co-defendant.14
me  Court,1n  an  opinion  by  Justice  lthite,  rejected  the
petitioners'  1nterpretatlon  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  because
of  its  inconsistency  with  precedent.     The  Court  observed:
The  established  principle  is  that  suppression  of  the
product  of  a  Fourth  Amendment  violation  can  be  success-fully urged  only  ty  those  "hose  rights  were  violated
by  the  search  itself ,  not  by  those  who  are  aggrieved
solely  by  the  introduction  of  damaging  evldenoe,  co-
conspirators  and  co-defendants  have  n®  speelal  standing.15
IIi  the  cases  being  heard,  any  petitioner  would  be  able
to  move  to  suppress  the  evidence  against  him,  if  it  was
obtained  in violation  of  his  Fourth  Amendment  right  to  be
free  from  uz]reasonable  searches  and  seizures.    Such  a  violation
said  the  Court  ".   .   .  would  occur  lf  the  United  States  un-
1apffully  overheard  Conversations  of  the  petitioner  himself
or  conversations  occurring  on  his  premises,  whether  or not
he  was  present  or  participated  in  these  conversations."t6
the  remaining  portion  of  the  opinion  dealt  with  the  pro-





the  ultimate  issue  which  will  be  before  it--whether  the
evidence  against  any  petltloner  grew  out  of his  illegally
overheard  conversations  occurring  on  his  premises.     The
Court  informed  the  Goverrment  that  it  mtist  disclose  to  the
petltloners  for  examination  any  surveillance  records  which
are  relevant  to  the  decision  of  the  issue  at  hand,  even  though
this  disclosure might  constitute  a  potential  tlireat  to  the
reputation  of  third  parties  or  aL  potential  danger  to  national
seourity®     the  Goverrment's  alternative  to  the  disclosure
of  the  surveillance  records  was  to  drop  the  charges  agaLlnst
the  petitioners.17
Justice  White  instructed  the  I)1strict  Court  to
.   .   .  confine  the  evidence  presented  by  both  sides  to
that "hich is  material  to  the  question  of  a  possible
violation  of  a  petitioners'  Fourth  Amendment  rights ,
to  the  content  of  the  conversations  illegal.1y  over-
heard  by  surveillance  "hich violated  these  rights,  and
:£bg:€ur;£±ego=Sfc%:o:g?t8Conversations  to  the  peti tioners '
If  the  District  Court  found  a  vlolatlon  of  Fourth  Amend-
ment  rights  "hlch  resulted  in  the  subse.quentveonvietion  of
any  petitioner,  it  was  to  oonduet  a new  trial,  and  of  course,
exclude  the  evidence  obtained  through  the  use  of  illegal
electronic  surveillance.19
'7EEE£. ,  968-9.
18RE. ,  973-4.
]9EEfl. ,  974.
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The  overall  eff ect  of  this  decision  is  to  afford  for
the  first  time  to  a  third  party,  who  is  the  subject  of  an
inerlminating  corversation,  the  protection  of  the  F®urth
Amendment,  provided  that  the  injured  th±fd  party  ls  the  oTmer
of  the  premises  on  which  the  illegal  electronic  surveillapee
tock  place.    This  ls  somewhat  a  departure  from  previous
Constitutional  pronouncements  concermlng  the  rights  of  a
third  party  who  had  been  the  stib5ect  of  an  incriminating
conversation.
00NOLUSION_    I_I  __  I_   I_    ==_i  _  _   I
With  the  enactment  of  title  Ill  of  the  Olmibtls  Crime
Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968,  Congress  has  estab-
lished  both  procedural  and  substantive  standards  for  the
use  of  electronic  surveillance  by  law  enforcement  and  security
agencies.    It  remains  to  be  seen,  hourever,  what  the  reaction
of  the  Supreme  Court  will  be  to  these  legislatively  sanctioned
procedures.
At  this  writing  no  case  involving  fitle  Ill  has  reached
the  Court.     4n  analysis  of  tlie  opinions  of  the  preseint  members
of  the  Court  in  those  cases  in  ithich  similar  issues  arising
out  of  analogous  legislation  were  before  the  Cour.t  will  be
helpful  in  seeking  to  project  the  probable  interpretation
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whloh  the  present  Court  might  place  on  key  provisions  of
title Ill,
Let  us  consider  the  opinion  of  the  Court  in  B_e_I_g_er  V.
Eg=[  ][g=!E.2°Here  the  Court  construed  a  New  York  statute  of
1939  which  allowed  for  the  lssuamce  of  court  orders  auth-
orizing  electronic  sul`veillanee  by  law  enforcement  officials.21
Before  a  court  could  issue  an  eavesdrop  ol.den,  however,  the
requesting  officer  Has. required  to .show  ''reasonable  ground''
that  evidence  of  a  crime  could  be  obtained.     the  relevant
portion  of  the  New  York  statute  ls  very  similar  to  the
provlslons  of  gitle  Ill;  thus,  the  reasoning  of  the  Court
in  the  B_erger  declslon  might  be  lndioaLtlve  of  its  inter-
pretation  of  the  provisions  of  Title  Ill.
Justice  Olark,  speaking  for  the  ma3orlty  ln  F_erg_er_,
held  tha;t  the  RTew  York  statute  was  ''too  br6ad  in  its  sweep
resulting  im  a  trespassory  intrusion  into  a  constitutionally
protected  area."  Justice  Olark  indicated,  however,  that
properly  drawn  eavesdrop  statutes  could  meet  Fourth  Amendment
requirements,  but  he  failed  to  define  a  "properly  drama
statute,"  except  for  saying  that  it  must  be  discriminate  and
particular  in  its  scope.    More  specifically,  the  majority
objected  to  the  New  York  statute  on  four  basic  points:   (I)
the  statute  authorized  the  issuanoe  of  eavesdrop  orders  on
20388  u.s.   41    (1967)
21N.I.   Code  Crlm.   Proc.,   see.   813-a   (1939).
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"reasonable  ground"  that  evidence  of  a  crime  could  be  obtained
not  requiring  the  belief  that  a  particular  offense  would  be
committed;   (2)  the  two-month  author.ization  period  was  equi-
valent  to  a  sel.ies  of  intrusions,  searches,  and  seizures
following  a  single  showing  of  probable  cause;   (3)  the  statute
allowed  too  much  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  investigating
officer  ln  that  it  placed  no  termination  on  the  surveilla]ice
once  the  evidence  sought  was  obtained;   (4)  the  statute  had
no  requirement  of  notice,  nor  did  it  over.come  that  defect
by  requiring  some  special  showing  of  facts.    In  short,  the
statute's  broad  authorization  to  eavesdrop  was  without  ade-
quate  supervision  or  protective  procedures.22
Justice  Douglas  Concurred  111  a  separate  opinion  ''because
at  long  last Ethe  oourt]  overrules  g±±2 sllentio Ohstead  v.
Pp_i±_e_a_  Stai;es   .   .   .  and  its  offspring  and  brings  whretapplng
and  other  electronic  eavesdropping  fully within  the  purview
of  the  Fourth  Amendment."23Douglas  maintained  that  eleotronio
surveillance  wh.1ch  collects  evidence  and/or  provides  leads
to  evidence  cannot  be  constltutlonal  under  the  Fourth  Amend+-
ment.24
Justice  Stewart  also  concurmed  in  the  result  of  the  Court
while  dissenting  as  to  the  reasoning  of  the majority.    1thlle
22388  u.S.   41 ,   55-60.
23EEfl. ,  64.
24EEEL. ,   67.
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Stewart  agreed  with  the  dissenters  as  to  the  constitutionality
of  the  New  York  statute  and  the  electronic  surveillance  per-
mitted  by  it,  he maintained  that  the  electronie  surveillance
ln  the  present  case  was  unoonstltutlonal  because  the  affi-
davits  presellted  did  not  constitute  a  sufficient  showing
of  probable  cause  as  to  justify  a  broad  invasion  of  sixty  days.
Justlee  Stewart  was  looking  at  the  facts  of  the  particular
case,  while  the  majority  struck  down  the  entire  statute
because  of  the  unconstitutionality  of  all  its  provisions.25
this  case-by-case  approach was  also  suggested  by  the  other
dissenters:    White,  IIarlan,  and  Black.
Justice  White  perceived  the  issue  ln  B_erg__e_r  to  be
"hether  or  not  "±!±±g  search  complied  whtll  Fourth  Amendment
standards?"  He  maintained  that  it  did,  and  should  have  been
held  constitutional.    White  accused  the  Court  of  attempting
to  declare  all  rdretapplng  and  other  electronic  eavesdropping
constitutionally  impermissable  by  laying  dolm  requirements  for
legalized  electronic  surveillamoe  which  are  practically
impossible  to  meet.    fithite  further  pointed  up  the  importance
of  electronic  surveillance  to  effective  law  enforceme]it.    It
would  seem  that  Justice  White  would  be  in `favor  of  similar
f ederal  legislation.26
Justice  Harlan  looked  at  the  problem  of  reasonableness
25EEE. ,  67.
26RE.,  "o.
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in  legalized  electronic  surveillance  in  the  following manner:
.  .   .  any  linitations,  for  exanple,  necessary  upon  the
period  over  "hich  eavesdropping  map  be  conducted,  or
upon  the  us'e  of  intercepted  information  uncorm.eeted
rdth  the  offezises  for  which  the  eavesdropping  order
was  first  issued,  should  properly  be  developed  only
through  a  case-by-case  exanlnation  of  the  pertinent
qtiestion.    It  stiffices  here  to  emphasize  that  in  my
m±§¥:i:!frt:¥;Cs::¥£::rfgpni%=#a:gn:gL:ts:=gfr-
Justice  Black,  ±m  his  usual  absolutist  marmer,  main-
tained  that  neither  the  Fourth nor  any  other  thendment  harmed
the  use  of  evidence  obtained  through  the  tise  of  electronic
surveillance.    To  put  it  in  his  words:
Ifad  the  Franers  of  this  Amendment  desired  to  prohlblt
the  use  in  court  of  evidence  secured  ty  an  unreasonable
search  and  seizure,  they would  ]1ave  used  plain,  appropriate
language  to  do  so,  just  as  they  did  in  prohibiting  the  tise
of  emforeed  self-incriminating  evidence  ln``the  Hfth
Amendment  ....     S®  I  continue  t®  believe  that  the
exclusionary  rule  formtilated  to  bar  such  evidence  in  the
Weeks  case  is  not  rooted  in  the  Fourth  Amendment  but  rests
on  the  'supervisory  power'  of  this  Court  over  the  other
federal  courts  ....    F®r  these  reasons  .   .   .  I  do  not
believe  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  standing  alone,  even
if  applicable  to  electronic  eavesdropping,  comman
exclusion  of  the  overheard  evidence  in  this  case. !8  the
It  would  seem  that  a maj®rlty  of  the  members  of  the
Court would  froim  on  a  federal  statute  similar  to  that  of
Hew  York.     The  question  is:   Does   Title  Ill  have  enough




constitutional  bounds?    One  author  maintains  that  since
the  requirenents  for  the  issuamce  ®f  electroflic  eavesdropping
orders  were  lifted,  for  the  most  part,  verbatim  from  the
majority  opinion  in  P±_r_g=er  that  title  Ill  will  present  no
real  constitutional  problems  in  the  future.29Thile  this
may very  well  be  Correct,  there  are  two  aspects  of  Title  Ill
that might  possibly  lead  to  future  problems.     these  are
the  length  of  time  during  which  electronic  surveillance  is
allowed  and  the  absence  of  the  requiremerlt  of  notice  of  the
search before  the  surveillance  begins.
Title  Ill  allows  an  initial  period  of  thirty  days,
renewable  every  thirty  dagrs ,  for  electronic  surveillaflce.
Eiren  though  this  is  but  half  of  that  allowed  by  the  New  Fork
statute,  it  still  constitutes  a  broad  invaLsion  of  privacy,
even  of  a  specified  place.     in  light  of  the  _B_erg_er  decision,
it  would  seem  that  the  Court  would  look  more  favorably  on  a
shorter,  more  discriminate  period  of  time.
the  second  potential  problem  is  the  absence  of  flotice.
In  conventional  searches,  the  person  whose  premises  are  to
be  searched  must  be  put  ofl  notice  before  the  search  begins.
Title  11  does  require, .,hoiFever,  that notice  be  given  after
the  search  ends.     The  majority  ln  _B_erg_er  held  that  notice
must  be  given  prior  to  the  search  and  if  this  is  not  done
of  se::gf  gange£2£=:?#hg :  ;'8:C?B=8£V3:3B::83u±Eer¥ep5£¥tioai
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Some  special  showing  of  facts  must  be  made  in  order  to
obtain  a  waFTamt  for  the  eavesdrop.     title  Ill  requires
neither  of  these  conditions  and  in  the  eyes  of  the  present
Court  this  may  well  result  in  a  decision  declaring  the  lack
of  these  safeguards  to  constitute  a  violation  of  the  Fourth
thendment.
Finally,  it  is  believed  that  Title  Ill as  a whole  will
Cause  no  constitutional  problems  due  to  the  speclflcity
of  its  provisions,  but  if  eitlier  of  the  above  mentioned
aspects  of  fltle  Ill  arises  as  a  specific  issue,  the  Court
would  probably  reverse  the  conviction,  not  withstanding  tlie
present  trend  of  Court  appointees  who  are  conservative  on
the  issue  of  law  and  order.
Thus  we  see  that  Congress  has  attempted  in  title  Ill
of  the  Omnibus  Orime  Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968
to  define  the  prodedures  by  ithieh  electronic  eavesdropping
may  be  used  by  law  enforcement  officers  in  specific  cases
without  violating  Constitutional  provisions.    Once  before,
in  1928,  Congress  had  a  similar  task  thrust  upon  then  ty  the
Oourt's  opinion  ln  the  _01ms_teed  case.     The  result  was  section
605  of  the  Federal  Cormunications  Act  of  1934  dealing  with
the  practice  of  wiretapping.    At  that  time  the  Court  held
rdretapping  to  be  beyond  the  purview  of  the  Fourt]i  Amendment.
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Today,   the  Court  has  broadened  the  '`search  and  seizure"
provision  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  include  protection
of  the  "right  of  privaey"  against  an  unreasonable  search  and
seizure  through  electronic  surveillance.    It  would  seem,  then,
that  the  provisions  of  title  Ill must wait  for  "validation''
by  the  court  before  they  can  be  regarded  by  law  enforcement
officials  as  eff ective  tools  in  the  system  of  Criminal
Justice.
APPENDIX  A
Seotlon  605.     |Piap±±]ipr|ze£  I::2P|ioai±g±  gE IZ=± 2£ ?Ppqu!1ic?tio±±
ro  person  receiving  or  assisting  in  receiving,  or
tralismitting  or  assisting  in  transmitting,  any  interstate
or  foreig]i  comrmmlcathon  ty  tire  or  ra,dio  shall  divulge
or  publish  the  exlstenoe,  contents,  substance,  purport,
effect  or mea[iing  tliereof ,  eEoept  through  authorized
charmels  of  transmission  ®r  reception.  to  any  person
other  tha]i  the  addressee,  his  agent  or  attorney,  or  to
a  person  employed  or  authorized  to  forrma,rd  such  comm-
unioaLtion  to  its  destination  or  to  proper  accounting  or
distributing  officers  of  the  various  communicating  centers
over  thlch  the  communication  may  be  passed,  or  in  response
to  a  subpoena  issued  by  a  court  of  competent  Jurisdiction,
or  on  demand  of  other  laithil  authority;  a]id  no  person
not  being  authorized  by  the  sender  shall  intercept  any
cormlmication  and  divulge  or  publish  the  existence,
Contents,  substance,  purport,  effect  or meaning  of  such
intercepted  comrmmication  to  any  person;   and  no  person
not  being  entitled  thereto  shall  receive  or  assist
in  receiving  any  interstate  or  foreign  coumimication  by
whre`,or radio  and  use  the  same  or  any  information  tliereln
Contained  for his  own  use  or  t]ie  benefit  of  another  not
being  entitled  thereto;  and  no  person  hanring  received
such  intercepted  communication  or  having  become  acquainted
ttith  the  contelits,  substance,  purport,  effect  or  meaning
of  t]ie  same  or  a]ny  part  thereof ,  ]moiulng  t]iat  such  infor-
nation was  so  obtained,  shall  divulge  or  publish  the
existence,  contents,  substance,  purport,  effect  or  meaning
of  the  same  or  any  part  thereof ,  or  use  the  same  or  any
information  therein  contained  for  his  oral  benefit  or  the
Be=%::::fa=#°:ira:Sires:L±i::L#::t:i"¥8E§:FSu5#:h.this
ing,  or  utilizing  the  contents  of  any  radio  communication
broadcast  or  transmitted  by  amateurs  or  others  for  the
use  of  the  general  public,  or  relating  to  ships  ln  distress.
cepENDlx  a
8=:±±8:in£:|g:at±:;=g9±=±-Z±±±e± E9E  Interc eDtion  2£ wL±=s g=
(1 )   the  Attorney  General,  ®r  any  Assistant  Attorney
General  specifically  designated  by  the  Attorney  General,
may  authorize  an  application  to  a,  Federal  judge  of  com-
petent  jurisdiction  for,  and  stlch  judge magr  grant  in
Conformity  with  Section  2518  of  this  Chapter  all  order
authorizing  or  approving  the  interception  of  wire  or
oral  communications  by  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,
or  a  Federal  agency having  responsibility  for  the  inves-
tlgaEion`'of, am  offense:as  to  wlilch  the  application  is  made
when  such  lnteroeption may  provide  or  has  provided  evidenceOf-
fer(:!r#EL#f:i:eyg##it::es:¥t±::sth28;4bythrng#82#+ent
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5  (relating  to  treason),  chapter  t02  (relating  to




e  29,  United  States  Code  (dealing  with  restrictions
on  payments  or  loans  t®  labor  organizations),  or  alry
offense  which  involves  murder,  kidnapping,  robbery,  or
extortion,  and  which  is  pun.ishable  under  this  title;
(a)  any  offense  "hich  is  pimishable  un.der  the  follow-
ing  sections  of  this  title:  section  20
officials  and  witnesses),  Section  224
ing  contests),  section  i084  (tramsmiss
(bribery  of  ptiblic
bribery  ln  sport-
on  of  wagering
information) ,  section  1503  (influencing  or  in3ufing  -an
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Presidential  assassinations ,  kidnapping.,  and  ass'ault ) ,
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(e)  any  offense  involving  bankruptcy  fraud  or  the
manufacture ,  importation,  receiving,  concealment,
buyi]1g,  selling,  or  otherwise  dealing  ln narcotic
drugs,  marijuana,  or  other  dangerous  drugs,  punish-
able  under  the  law  of  the  United  States;
(f )  any  offense  including  extortionate  credit  trams-
actions  lmder  sections  892,  893,  or  894  of  this  title;
Or
(g)  any  Conspiracy  to  commit  any  of  i;he  foregoing
off ens es .
(2)  the  principal  prosecuting  attorney  of  any  State  orthe  principal  prosecuting  attorney  of  any political
subdivision  thereof ,  if  such attorlley  is  authorized  by
a  stathlte  of  that  State  to  make  applications  to  a  Stai;e
court  judge  of  competent  ]urisdietion  for  an  order
authorizing  or  approving  the  interception  of  rfure  or  oral
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chapter  and  with  the'.applicable  State  statute  an  order
atithorizing  or  approving  the  interception  of  wire  or
oral  communications  by  investigative  or  law  enforcement
officers  having  the  responsibility  for  the  investigation
of  the  offense  as  to  which  the  application  is  made,  when
such  interception may  provide  or  has  provided  evidence  of
the  commission  of  the  offense  of  murder,  kidnapping,
gambling,  robbery,  brib'ery,  extortion,  or  dealing  illnarcotic  drugs ,  marijuana  or  other  dangerous  drugs ,  or
other.crimes  dangerous  to  life,limb,  or  property,  and
punishable  by  imprisorment  for  more  than  one  year,
designated  in  any  applicable  State  statute  authorizing  such
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